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STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM: POWER AND
INTERPRETATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

JAMES A. GARDNER*

ABSTRACT

In the American constitutionaltradition,federalism is commonly
understood as a mechanism designed to institutionalize a kind of
permanent struggle between state and national power. The same
American constitutional tradition also holds that courts are
basically passive institutions whose mission is to apply the law
impartially while avoiding inherently political power struggles.
These two commonplace understandingsconflict on theirface. The
conflict may be dissolved for federal courts by conceiving their
resistance to state authority as the impartial consequence of limitations on state power imposed by the United States Constitution.
This reconciliation,however, is unavailablefor state courts, which,
by operation of the Supremacy Clause, cannot employ national
law as a force for resisting nationalpower while simultaneously
appealing to it as a legitimatingsource of impartialrestrictionson
thatpover.
This Article arguesthat the tension between these understandings
need not be resolved at all for state courts simply because there is
nothing wrong with state courts using what powers they have to
protectpopularliberty by resisting,or by helping otherstate officials
to resist, abuses of national authority. Through their control over
state constitutions, state courts are capable of influencing the
manner and the forcefulness with which state governments may
wage the kinds of strugglesagainstnationalauthoritycontemplated
* Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at Buffalo Law School.
Thanks to Robert Schapiro for helpful comments on a prior draft and to Jesse Baldwin
for valuable research assistance.
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by federalism. State courts may do so by folding into their
interpretationof state constitutionalprovisionsconsiderationof the
"federalismeffects" of their rulings-that is, the impact of their
constructions on the ability of the state effectively to resist abuses
of national power. In so doing, state courts become "agents of
federalism."
The Article then considers and rejects a variety of strict
constructionistobjections to this approach to constitutional interpretation, discusses the conditions in which state courts might
receive popular authorization to act as agents of federalism, and
explores some of the ramifications for state constitutional interpretation of popular decisions concerning the authority of state
courts.
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INTRODUCTION

In the American constitutional tradition, federalism is commonly
understood as a mechanism designed to institutionalize a permanent struggle between state and national power. The ultimate
beneficiaries of this power struggle are the American people, whose
liberty is thus protected by a "double security."'1 The same American
constitutional tradition also holds that courts are basically passive
institutions whose mission is merely to apply the law impartially,
while avoiding inherently political power struggles.' These two
commonplace understandings conflict on their face. Courts are
institutions of governance; the judiciary is, after all, one of the three
coordinate branches of government created by the United States
Constitution and by every state constitution. Yet if courts are
institutions of governance, then the values underpinning federalism
appear to compel them to stand with their own coordinate executive
and legislative branches against the interests of other levels of
government when push comes to shove in any intergovernmental
power struggle. If, as Madison claimed, liberty is most threatened
when the various organs of government cooperate, and it is best
protected when the interests and motives of governmental actors
conflict,3 then courts, like legislatures and executives, ought to
choose up sides at least some of the time. That is to say, they ought
to assert the interests of their own level of government against the
other-a conception ofjudicial power that conflicts directly with the
ideal of judicial impartiality before the law.
One way to dissolve this tension is to conceive of courts as
somehow standing outside of, and thus institutionally unconcerned
with, the kinds of power struggles between state and national
government that federalism contemplates.' A moment's reflection,
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (claiming courts have "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment").
3. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
4. The Supreme Court briefly embraced a very strong form of this principle in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), holding that the
constitutional balance between state and national power was to be maintained almost
entirely through political rather than judicial processes. See id. at 546. The Court has since
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however, shows that this is certainly far from the case where
federal courts are concerned. In fact, federal courts have long
played a highly significant role in actively resisting what they take
to be improper uses of state power, most notably by invalidating
state laws that violate the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, Justice
Holmes once remarked that he thought the power of federal courts
to invalidate unconstitutional state laws so important that its loss
would threaten the very survival of the Union.
This kind of national activity, however, need not impugn the idea
of courts as standing outside of intergovernmental power struggles.
This is because the invalidation of a state law by a federal court can
be understood as the impartial consequence of limitations on state
power imposed by the U.S. Constitution-limitations imposed, that
is to say, by law rather than upon the say-so of federal courts
engaged in an intergovernmental power struggle against state
authority. The idea ofjudicial neutrality can thus be preserved even
within the federal structure: when federal courts resist state power
they may be understood as merely undertaking a very traditional
kind of impartial adjudication, thereby dissolving the tension
between conventional understandings of federalism and judicial
apoliticism.6

distanced itself somewhat from this approach. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
The Court of course continues to take the position that judicial intervention in federalism
cases is mandated by the Constitution rather than by the Court's predisposition toward the
exercise of power at any particular level. Interestingly, unlike its interventions during the
late 1930s and 1940s, as in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court's recent
interventions have sided with state over national power. This is the opposite position one
would expect if federalism institutionalized a purely self-favoring attitude among officials at
any particular level of government.
5. "Ido not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare
an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court,
in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).

6. Of course, the availability of this resolution has never stopped critics of the federal
courts from claiming that the results in many cases are explained not by the Constitution,
but by a desire on the part of the federal judiciary to expand national authority at the
expense of state authority. See R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall,McCulloch v. Maryland,
and the Southern States' Rights Tradition,33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875 (2001) (describing
attacks on the Court following the McCulloch decision); William G. Ross, Attacks on the
Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-CurbingMovements Fail, 50
BUFF. L. REV. 483 (2002) (describing similar attacks during the Warren era).
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This method of reconciling the two understandings is unavailable, however, when we turn to state courts because there is
no superseding body of law to which state courts might resort that
would enable them to control with finality the actions of national
officials. Because the Supremacy Clause makes national law
supreme,7 and national law is controlled ultimately by federal
courts, state courts cannot employ national law as a force for
resisting national power while simultaneously appealing to it as a
legitimating source of impartial restrictions on that power. Federal
courts, not state courts, ultimately decide what powers the state
and national governments legitimately possess under the U.S.
Constitution.
This asymmetry between state and national judicial power
suggests a different way of reconciling federalism's imperative of
governmental self-partiality with notions of judicial apoliticism: it
may be that this tension simply does not exist for state courts
because they lack the tools to join effectively in any struggle against
national power that other organs of state government might choose
to wage. As Stalin once said of the Pope: "How many divisions has
he got?"8 What weapons do state courts possess that they could
deploy against national power should some tyrannical action of the
federal government justifiably prompt resistance from state
governments? About the only thing state courts definitively control
is the content of state law, yet state law generally cannot restrict
officials in any branch of national government, and can often be
displaced by Congress, through preemption, and by federal courts,
through invalidation under the U.S. Constitution. Does this mean,
then, that state courts have no role to play in maintaining the
balance of state and national power contemplated by federalism?
Are they mere bystanders to a permanent struggle against national
power waged by the state legislative and executive branches?
I think not. State law is capable of controlling something potentially significant to any struggle by states to resist national power:
other state officials. Through their control over state law, and in
particular through their control over the state constitution, state
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE GATHERING STORM 135 (1948) (reporting Stalin's

statement) (emphasis omitted).

2003]

STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM

1731

courts are capable of exercising some influence over the manner and
forcefulness with which state governments may wage the kinds of
struggles against national authority contemplated by federalism.
By construing the provisions of the state constitutions that both
empower and restrict the state legislative and executive branches,
state courts can influence the facility with which state government
responds to threats originating at the national level; the tools that
state actors have at their disposal to resist encroachments by
national power; and the ways in which state officials may deploy
those tools in intergovernmental power struggles.
If state courts are thus understood as potentially significant
actors in the process by which states resist national power, then the
tension between the imperatives of federalism and the imperatives
of judicial neutrality cannot be dissolved on the ground that state
courts are too weak to participate in federalism's mechanism of
mutual intergovernmental checking. How then can the tension be
resolved? In this Article, I argue that the tension need not be
resolved at all for the simple reason that there is nothing wrong
with state courts using what powers they have to protect popular
liberty by resisting, or helping other state officials to resist, abuses
of national authority. Indeed, there is much to recommend such an
understanding of state judicial power.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the mechanics
of federalism and explores the role, if any, that state courts might
play in the intergovernmental struggles contemplated by
federalism. Part II introduces state judicial power by discussing two
conventional and well-understood ways in which state courts can
use their powers to improve the lives and protect the liberty of the
state's citizens: by using affirmatively granted judicial powers to
advance the public good directly; and by using the power ofjudicial
review to restrain state governments from tyrannizing their own
citizens. When state courts use their powers in these ways, they are
acting, I shall say, as "agents of state power."
Part III examines the ability of state courts to use their powers
for a different purpose: to resist tyranny resulting not from actions
taken by state officials, but from actions of the national government. Part III thus examines the ability of state courts to act as
"agents of federalism"-that is, as organs of state government
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devoted to fulfilling the federal plan of mutually checking state and
national power. State courts, I argue, are fully capable of serving as
agents of federalism in at least two ways, one direct and the other
indirect. In a recent article, I explain how state courts may take a
direct role in checking abuses of national power--especially abuses
of national judicial power-by interpreting generously the scope of
individual liberty under the state constitution.9 In this Article, I
expand that argument into a general theory of state judicial
resistance to national power by extending the analysis to structural
provisions of state constitutions that govern the allocation of state
power. I argue that state courts may serve indirectly as agents of
resistance to national power by construing the state constitution in
such a way as to assure, insofar as possible, that the state legislative and executive branches have powers adequate to resist
abuses of national power. In laying out this account, Part III
discusses at some length the tools available to state courts acting
as indirect agents of federalism, and explains how state courts
might fold into their interpretation of state constitutional provisions an analysis of what I call the "federalism effects" of their
rulings-namely, the impact of their constructions of the state
constitution on the ability of the state effectively to resist abuses of
national power.
This account of state judicial power departs considerably from the
conventional view in that it regards state courts as possessing, at
least in theory, the authority to interpret the state constitution
instrumentally, to achieve a particular result: effective resistance
to national tyranny. This places my account squarely in opposition
to a well-developed contemporary theory of constitutional jurisprudence that rules out instrumental, result-oriented constitutional
interpretation as inherently illegitimate.1" Part IV responds to
these strict constructionist objections by arguing that their force,
whatever it may be, is confined to the national setting of national
judicial power and is inapplicable to state judicial power which,
9. James A. Gardner, State ConstitutionalRights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a FunctionalTheory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO.L.J. (forthcoming June 2003).
10. For a thorough exposition ofthis theory of constitutional interpretation, see ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutman ed.,

1997).
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because of the federal structure of American government, operates
in a significantly different institutional context.
Having disposed of the theoretical objections, I turn in Part V to
the practical question of popular authorization. Just because state
courts are equipped to play a role in resisting abuses of national
power does not mean that they are authorized to do so. As with any
other branch of state government, whether a state court has the
authority to join this struggle depends upon whether the people of
the state have constitutionally authorized it to participate. Such
authorization, in turn, depends to a great degree on the patterns of
distrust that prevail among the people of the state. The more the
people trust the state judicial branch to protect their liberty
actively, through direct resistance to national tyranny, the more
likely they are to grant it the authority to do so, and vice versa. In
reviewing the likelihood that the people of a state might trust
their courts enough to grant them authority to act as agents of
federalism, Part V considers both institutional factors and the
actual historical record of state courts in protecting liberty against
incursions by the national government.
Part VI concludes with a brief examination of the ramifications
for state constitutional interpretation of popular decisions concerning the authority of state courts to act as agents of federalism.
The basic principle may be simply stated. The more authority state
courts are granted to serve as agents of federalism by monitoring
and resisting abuses of national power, the more flexibility they are
necessarily authorized to bring to the interpretation of the state
constitution." Conversely, the more tightly the people of the state
have, through their state constitution, reined in the exercise of
judicial power, the less flexibly state courts may approach state
constitutional interpretation, and the more fastidiously they must
observe popular decisions set forth in the state constitution.12
Constitutional decisions concerning state judicial authority thus
allocate between the people and their courts the authority to
monitor and check abuses of national power. Federalism requires
that some state actors monitor vigilantly the actions of the national
11. See infra Part VI.B.
12. See id.
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government. Which organs of government undertake this job, or
whether the people reserve it entirely to themselves, is a question
to be decided in the adoption of a state constitution. Significantly,
popular resolution of this question simultaneously resolves a good
deal of uncertainty about how state courts should approach and
interpret state constitutions.
I. FEDERALISM AND STATE COURTS

The theory underlying the American practice of federalism could
not be simpler. People create governments to "secure the[iri
rights."" Yet because governments must be run by human beings,
and human beings are weak, concentrated governmental power can
be dangerous to liberty." Consequently, the only form of government in which liberty is safe is one in which governmental power is
dispersed and divided in such a way as to set different parts of
government against the others. In Madison's words, "[aimbition
must be made to counteract ambition." i" Our Constitution thus
divides power not only horizontally among three branches of
government, but also vertically between state and national governments.Is In this way "a double security arises to the rights of the
people." 7 Federalism thus aims to institutionalize a more or less
permanent struggle between the state and national governments
for the purpose of better protecting the liberty of all: "a healthy

13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
14. See THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As

Madison stated:
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary
to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the
greatest ofall reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself.
Id.; see also THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing
human tendency toward the pursuit of self-interest).
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16. U.S. CONST. arts. I-Ill; id. amends. X-XI.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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competition between federal and [state] officials can help protect
citizens against government tyranny." 18
Despite its theoretical transparency, surprisingly little is understood about how federalism works in actual practice.' 9 How exactly,
and in what circumstances, do state and national governments
struggle against one another? What tools are available to governmental actors engaged in this struggle? Who is responsible for
taking the battle to the other side, and how is that responsibility
discharged? To the extent these questions have been studied at all,
most of the research has focused on the roles of the national
government and the state legislative and executive branches.
Virtually no attention, however, has been paid to the role state
courts might play in implementing federalism's plan of mutually
checking governmental power.
A moment's contemplation of American constitutional history
reveals clearly that all three branches of the nationalgovernment
have at various times played significant roles in resisting abusive
exercises of state power. Congress, for example, has often used its
power of preemption to invalidate state laws of which it disapproves, 20 and has used its ability to attach conditions to federal
spending as a powerful means of inducing states to behave in ways
that Congress desires. 2 ' Similarly, the national executive branch
has resisted state power by means ranging from the prosecution
of the Civil War, to the use of force to enforce national civil rights
law against recalcitrant states, 22 to the wholly peaceful use of

negotiation with state officials in the routine administration of
national law. 23 The national courts have also played a significant
18. Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483,
498-99 (1991).
19. Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1487-91 (1994).

20. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land: and the
judges, in every state, shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding Congress' use of its
spending power to induce states to set the minimum drinking age at twenty-one).
22. For an account of the armed enforcement of desegregation in Little Rock in 1957, see
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA INTHE KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 222-24
(1989).
23. This is one of the cornerstones of the contemporary notion of"cooperative federalism."
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role in resisting improper uses of state power, frequently striking
down state laws that violate the U.S. Constitution.2 4
At the state level, it is clear that state legislatures and executives
have often played an important part in resisting national power.
For example, these branches occasionally have employed force or
the threat of force against the national government in instances
ranging from secession during the Civil War, to the threat of
armed resistance during the Nullification Crisis, 25 to the threatened seizure of federally owned public lands during the Sagebrush
Rebellion.2 6 State legislatures have publicly denounced" and
For some classic expositions of this position, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW
VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); MICHAEL D.
REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972). For a more recent account placing cooperative
federalism in historical perspective, see DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM:
SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON chs. 4-6 (1995).
24. In its most recent Term, the Court struck down state laws in four cases. See
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting issue-based campaigning by judicial candidates pursuant to the First
Amendment); Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (invalidating a state statute requiring
trial judges to determine the existence of aggravating factors in capital cases pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (invalidating a state law
permitting execution of the mentally retarded pursuant to the Eighth Amendment);
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002)
(invalidating a local ordinance requiring all solicitors to obtain a permit for door-to-door
advocacy pursuant to the First Amendment). For a complete listing of state laws struck down
through June 28, 2000, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 203341 (Johnny H. Killian & George

A. Costello eds., 1992 & Supp. 2000), availableat http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senatel
constitution (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
25. See WILLIAM H. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION
CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836 (1966) (describing the South Carolina
legislature's enactment of and attempts to enforce an "Ordinance of Nulification," which was
passed to abolish tariffs established by Congress).
26. For an overview ofthe "Sagebrush Rebellion," see R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL
LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 109-10
(1993); WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION ANDTHE SAGEBRUSH REBELLIONS 22532 (1990). For accounts of specific threats by states to claim federally owned land, see PAUL
WALLACE GATES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND RECENT AMERICAN LAND POLICIES 3 (1980)
(describing Nevada's 1979 legislation 'declaring state sovereignty over 49 million acres of
Nevada territory" owned by the national government); 'Sagebrush Rebels" Are Reveling in
Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1980, at D9 (reporting that the legislatures of Nevada, Utah,
Arizona and Wyoming had passed resolutions "laying claim to Federal lands within their
boundaries").
27. Important examples are the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, drafted by Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison, respectively, in which the legislatures of those two states
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defied2" national laws of which they disapprove, and have sometimes attempted to subvert disfavored national legislation by footdragging 9 and by deliberately ineffective enforcement.8 0 State
legislatures and governors also routinely attempt to influence the
content of national legislation through the use of lobbying and
political pressure. 3 ' They have also been known to refuse national
financial incentives when they disapprove of federally-imposed

denounced the federal Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 as unconstitutional. 4 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29,540-44 (Jonathan Elliot ed., photo. reprint
1987) (1888). The Resolutions are also available online at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb
avalon/18th.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
28. State acts of defiance have included, for example, post-Lochner enactment of wage
and hour laws, and post-Roe enactment of abortion prohibitions, often as deliberate test
cases. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating Nebraska's ban on
"partial birth" abortions); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down detailed regulation of abortion procedures); City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating a requirement that
abortions be performed in a hospital); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (striking down spousal consent requirement for abortion); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage law for women); Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U.S. 426 (1917) (invalidating maximum hour and overtime pay law for factory workers);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (invalidating maximum hours law for women engaged
in factory or laundry work). For a comprehensive analysis of state defiance of Roe, see
BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND
IMPACT 10-12 (2d ed. 1999).
29. One particularly vivid example of this phenomenon is the general failure of states to
exercise delegated authority to regulate nonpoint source pollution under section 319 of the
Clean Water Act. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
32(1992).
30. A notorious example is Montana's nonenforcement of the fifty-five mile-per-hour
national speed limit established by Congress in 1974. Instead of enforcing violations of the
fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit as traffic infractions, Montana issued five-dollar
"environmental" citations to drivers traveling above fifty-five miles-per-hour, but below what
Montana police considered a safe speed. Violations were not charged against drivers'
insurance records. See generally Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed
Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 157-62 (1999) (discussing the ineffectiveness of Montana's fiftyfive mile-per-hour speed limit); Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in
Montana, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989, at A14 (same). According to news accounts, the
"conventional wisdom" was that no serious infractions would be charged for daytime driving
below about eighty-five miles-per-hour in good weather conditions. Tom Kenworthy, New Life
in the FastLane: Wide-Open Throttles in Wide Open Spaces, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,1995, at A3.
31. See ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS:
INTERGOVERNMENTALLOBBYINGANDTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995); DONALD H. HADIER, WHEN
GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON: GOVERNORS, MAYORS, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
LOBBYING (1974); John Dinan, State Government Influence in the National Policy Process:
Lessons from the 104th Congress, 27 PUBLIUS 129 (1997).
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conditions, 32 and to sue the national government in federal court
to assure its compliance with limitations imposed by the U.S.
33

Constitution.

Missing from this picture, however, is any obvious role for the
state judicial branch in efforts by the state to resist abuses of
national power. In a way, this gap is not surprising. Courts in the
American tradition are essentially passive institutions, and their
ability to participate in the resolution of political issues depends
greatly on whether litigants bring such disputes before them.34 Yet
unlike federal courts, state courts are unlikely to adjudicate
lawsuits attacking purported abuses of national power by national
officials, or to have any legitimate and binding authority to resolve
them. First, although state courts typically have jurisdiction to hear
cases brought against organs of the national government, national
officials have an absolute right to remove such cases to federal
court, 35 a right which the United States Justice Department exer-

cises routinely as a matter of basic policy. 6 Second, state courts are
32. For example, New Hampshire has refused repeatedly to enact a mandatory seatbelt
law, thereby forgoing a portion of its allocation of federal highway maintenance and
construction funds. See Donn Tibbetts, Lift Seat-Belt Sanctions, Merrill Urges DOT Chief,
THE UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Jan. 28, 1995, at A-1, availableat LEXIS, News &
Business, The Union Leader File. Nevada and Wisconsin have sacrificed federal highway
funds by refusing to lower their statutory threshold for drunken driving convictions to a
blood alcohol level of 0.8%, in defiance of federal law requiring the adjustment. Amy Rinard,
State Paysfor Its 0. 10 Standard,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 21,2002, at Al, availableat
LEXIS, News & Business, The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel File; Ed Vogel, Lower Drunken
DrivingStandardSought, LASVEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 7, 2001, at 3B, availableat LEXIS, News
& Business, Las Vegas Review-Journal File. Kentucky recently abolished state vehicle
emission standards, threatening its ability to meet federally mandated pollution limits,
which would lead to the loss ofnearly $2 billion in federal highway funds. Tom Loftus, Patton
Signs BillAbolishing Vehicle Emissions Tests in Jefferson, THE COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Apr. 9, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News & Business, The Courier-Journal File.
33. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (challenging federal attempt
to commandeer state executive branches); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(challenging federal attempt to commandeer state legislatures).
34. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (acknowledging the passive nature of the federal courts
and advocating the use of prudential jurisdictional doctrines to limit constitutional
adjudication).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2000).
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL 45
(laying out department's preference for removal to federal court in most circumstances),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usam/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2003).
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required to obey national law, 37 and are in any event subject to
direct appellate oversight by the United States Supreme Court,"8
drastically limiting their ability to strike out at the national government. It is true, of course, that state courts could join the fray by
defying federal law, as state legislative and executive branches
have sometimes done, but this is a particularly unattractive option
for courts, which are, after all, uniquely dedicated to upholding
law, not defying it. 9 Thus, anything a state court might gain in
successfully resisting national power through illegal means might
in the long run work to that court's disadvantage by undermining
its claim to legitimacy as an impartial instrument of the law.
Does this mean, then, that state courts are solely organs of state
internal power that have no role to play in the external projection
of state power against the national government? If federal courts
possess and often exercise the authority to resist abuses of state
power, why, given the goals and methods of federalism, should state
courts not perform a similar and reciprocal function? Consider
the nature and purposes for which state power may be allocated.
Generally speaking, state power can be deployed for at least three
different purposes, each of which promotes liberty in a slightly
different way.' First, state power can be used to advance the public
good directly, through the exercise of ordinary governmental power.
Second, state power can be allocated and deployed for the purpose
of imposing upon state government some form of internal selfrestraint, as through mechanisms such as separation of powers,
judicial review, and a bill of rights. Third, state power can be
granted and deployed for the purpose of resisting abuses of power
originating at the national level.
State courts have obvious roles to play in exercising the first
two kinds of power. They clearly can use their granted powers to
advance the common good directly-for example, by shaping the
37. The Supremacy Clause specifically provides that "the Judges in every State shall be
bound" by national law. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, and that they shall take an oath to that
effect. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
38. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264,354-58 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342, 351 (1816).

39. See CANON& JOHNSON, supranote 28, at 38 (noting that defiance is "a relatively rare
event" and "threatening to the judicial system").
40. The balance of this paragraph draws on a fuller discussion in Gardner, supra note 9.
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state's common law to accomplish desirable social and economic
objectives. State courts also have a clear role in restraining state
power by enforcing the separation of powers established by the
state constitution and by protecting rights guaranteed under the
state constitution against infringement by other branches of state
government. The third kind of power, however, presents a more
difficult question. Do state courts have any role in maintaining the
balance of state and national power contemplated by federalism?
Are they mere bystanders to an ongoing struggle against national
power carried on by the state legislative and executive branches? Or
are they active participants, charged at least on occasion with
exercising their powers to resist national abuses?
The answer to these questions, I argue here, is: it depends. This
answer rests on two fundamental propositions. First, despite their
limited and sometimes passive role in state governance, state courts
nevertheless have powers which are capable of being turned against
the national government and used as weapons to resist tyrannical
abuses of national power. Second, whether state courts may use
these powers to resist national authority depends, quite simply, on
whether they have been authorized to do so by the people of the
state-it is a matter, that is to say, of positive legal authorization.
II. STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF STATE POWER
A. The Affirmative Use of Granted Powers to Advance the Public
Good
The most obvious function of any government is to exercise its
granted powers for the direct benefit of its citizens. As one of the
three primary branches of state government, the state judiciary
typically possesses considerable power, which it may deploy to serve
the public good in some very direct ways.
In its most basic manifestation, state judicial power serves the
public good when state courts do nothing more than undertake the
routine adjudication of individual cases. Deciding cases arising
under clearly established legal principles resolves disputes among
individual litigants, and reaffirms and reinforces the rule of law. In
criminal cases, the conviction and punishment of the guilty does
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justice and protects the public from further harm. In civil cases,
enforcement of the laws of tort, contract, and property not only does
justice in individual cases (or so one hopes), but also gives effect to
economic expectations, thereby establishing and maintaining a
necessary condition of economic prosperity. 1 Adjudication in its
most ordinary and least controversial forms thus promotes the
public good in significant ways.
State courts, however, typically have other, more discretionary
means at their disposal to advance the public good beyond the
somewhat "ministerial" function of applying established law to
individual cases. Surely the most prominent of these is the power
of a state court to make new law by deliberately shaping and selfconsciously improving the state's common law. The common law is
generally understood to embrace "[a] tradition of law improvement
by creative judicial action." 2 Although the bulk of common law
litigation consists of the routine application of existing legal rules
to familiar fact patterns, courts engaged in common law adjudication are sometimes in a position to choose quite deliberately
among alternative potential legal rules on the basis of "whether
those rules will conduce to a good or a bad state of affairs.""3 In
these situations, common law courts actively shape and remake the
law.44

Throughout the twentieth century, and especially in its middle
decades, American state courts developed a record of substantial
and rapid innovation in numerous areas of common law. In tort law,
for example, state courts developed the new torts of "false light" and
"disclosure of embarrassing private facts," and greatly expanded the
scope, and thus the utility to plaintiffs, of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' 5 They drastically restricted the scope of existing
41. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 16-30,
85-99, 173-210 (1977).
42. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 13 (1969).
43. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 43 (1988).
44. Common law courts also reshape the law passively, or at least indirectly, insofar as
common law rules evolve with each successive decision. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-4 (1949). This is a process that goes on continually
and irrespective ofjudicial intentions. I am concerned more here with the kind of deliberate
shaping of the law that occurs, for example, when courts overrule prior decisions. See
KEETON, supra note 42, chs. 1, 3.

45. James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished
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tort doctrines of municipal and charitable immunity, thus subjecting to liability numerous entities that had previously been
exempt." During this period, state courts also developed tort
doctrines of strict liability that greatly expanded the ability of
injured consumers to recover damages caused by defective
products,47 going so far in some instances as to create a form of
"enterprise liability" in which traditional principles not only of
fault, but of proof of causation, were displaced.48 Some tort cases,
such as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," which set the law of
product liability on a course away from restrictive contract
principles and toward more generous principles of tort,50 have
become well-known classics, held up within the legal profession as
examples of the best and highest expression of judicial craft.5
In these kinds of cases, courts do something more than
mechanically apply the law to new sets of facts: they alter the law,
in effect making new law, and do so with the deliberate aim of
adjusting controlling legal principles to bring about better, fairer,
and generally more desirable results. Although this function has
long been thought of as an integral part of adjudication in the
Anglo-American tradition, it is an aspect of the adjudicatory power
by which state courts historically have participated directly and
actively in the process of state-level governance-much more so
than if they routinely took the position that any changes in the
common law must be made by legislatures rather than courts.
Although the power to shape the common law is the most visible and probably the most powerful way in which state courts
Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1834-35 (2000); see also Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New
Tort: Three Paradoxes,75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1541-42 (1997) (noting the rise of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, strict products liability, invasion of privacy, and wrongful
discharge from employment as new torts in the twentieth century).
46. Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New
Doctrinesin the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 85-87 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
47. See KEETON, supra note 42, ch. 7.

48. See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of EnterpriseLiability and Common Law Strict
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1317-32 (2001); George L. Priest, The Invention of
EnterpriseLiability:A CriticalHistory of the IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law,
14 J.LEGAL STUD. 461, 505-18 (1985).
49. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 269-79 (1998); LEvI, supranote 44, at 9-25.
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participate actively in state-level governance, it is not the only way.
For example, many states grant their highest court the power to
issue advisory opinions, which the executive or legislative branches
are authorized to request.5 2 These branches often request advisory
opinions to assist their deliberations concerning the constitutionality of proposed or pending legislation.5" When a court issues an
advisory opinion concerning the constitutionality of proposed
legislation, it inserts itself directly into the deliberative process by
which law is made, becoming an active player in the legislative
process. 4 This is a more direct kind of participation in state
governance than a court undertakes when it merely reviews the
constitutionality of legislation after the fact.
State courts also participate directly in governance through their
power to make rules for judicial proceedings, a power typically
granted by state constitutions.55 Although the judicial rule-making
power is most often exercised to make procedural and evidentiary
rules, the impact of which is confined mainly to regulating the
52. See generally Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in
Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975) (discussing the role that state court advisory
opinions serve in those states that allow for advisory opinions); Helen Hershkoff, State
Courts and the "PassiveVirtues":Rethinking the JudicialFunction,114 HARV. L. REV. 1833,
1844-52 (2001) (discussing the scope and function of state court advisory opinions).
53. Some state constitutional provisions authorizing the issuance of advisory opinions
specifically limit the subject matter of such decisions to advice on constitutional issues. See,
e.g., MICH. CONST. art. III, § 8 ("Either house of the legislature or the governor may request
the opinion of the supreme court on important questions of law upon solemn occasions as to
the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective
date."). Alabama and Delaware have enacted similar limitations by statute. See ALA. CODE
§ 12-2-10 (1995) (limiting this power to situations involving "important constitutional
questions"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141(a) (1999) ("The Justices of the Supreme Court ...
may give ... their opinions in writing touching the ... constitutionality of any law or
legislation passed by the General Assembly.").
54. See Hershkoff, supra note 52, at 1851 ("Advisory opinions thus allow state courts to
[engage in] ... the ... dialogic process" with other branches of government.).
55. See generally ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 702-23 (3d ed. 1999).
In some states, the power to make rules is considered an inherent and exclusive aspect of
judicial power. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kelman v. Schaffer, 290 A.2d 327, 331 (Conn. 1971),
overruled on other grounds, Serrani v. Bd. of Ethics, 622 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1993) ("[Tihe
General Assembly lacks any power to make rules of administration, practice or procedure
which are binding on either the Supreme Court or the Superior Court."); see also Jeffrey A.
Parness, Public Processand State-CourtRulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 1319 (1979) (discussing
how state courts have used their constitutionally granted power to avoid legislative attempts
to curb judicial rule-making powers).
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adjudicatory process," judicial rules sometimes can touch upon
highly significant subjects. For example, well before the United
States Supreme Court decided in Gideon v. Wainwright 7 that the
U.S. Constitution guarantees indigent criminal defendants a right
to appointed counsel,'M several state courts had so provided by
ordinary rulemaking.5 9 State courts also engage in a form of
independent regulatory governance by making and administering
rules governing the legal profession, including rules for admission
to the bar and lawyer ethics and discipline.60 Finally, state courts
increasingly have come to participate directly in state governance
by creating and administering social service programs that are
more often associated with executive than with judicial power.
Among these are family court mediation programs, domestic
violence programs, and victim assistance programs.6 '
B. JudicialRestraintof State Tyranny
If state courts generally have the authority under state
constitutions to advance liberty by using their powers to achieve the
public good directly, they also universally have the constitutional
authority to use their power of judicial review to protect liberty in
another way: by serving as a force for state governmental selfrestraint. If a state government is to advance the public good, it
must possess a certain amount of power. The more power a state
government possesses, however, the more capable it is of threatening the liberties of its people. This threat may be restrained to a
56. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21 ("practice and procedure in civil and criminal
cases"); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. 3 ("administration ... practice and procedure in all
[state] courts").
57. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. Id.
59. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 216 N.E.2d 779 (Mass. 1966); People v. Parshay, 148
N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. 1967); State v. Delaney, 332 P.2d 71, 80 (Or. 1958).
60. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 61.2 (3d
ed. 2001).
61. See Christine M. Durham, The JudicialBranch in State Government: Parablesof
Law, Politics,and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601(2001); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from
the FederalParadigm:Separationof Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543 (1997).

For a recent overview, see generally Symposium, ProblemSolving Courts;From Adversarial
Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence,29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1751 (2002).
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degree by institutionalizing some form of internal self-restraint,
such as horizontal separation of powers, creation of a bill of rights,
and establishment ofjudicial review. State courts play a significant
role in the exercise of power to achieve this kind of internal selfrestraint.
Consider the separation of powers--often said to be an essential
safeguard of liberty 6 2-under state constitutions. In enforcing
these principles, state courts have, among other things, barred
legislators from sitting on executive branch commissions,"3
prohibited legislative officials from appointing executive branch
officials,6 4 prevented state judges from being required to serve
on administrative mediation boards,65 prohibited judicial appointment of special prosecutors,6 6 barred the use of a legislative veto,
and invalidated numerous instances of excessive delegations of
legislative authority to executive branch agencies. 6 State courts
have also enforced many other kinds of state constitutional
restrictions on the exercise of governmental power. They have
invalidated constitutionally-prohibited special legislation,6 9 struck
down laws that violated single-subject requirements, 7° and enforced
provisions requiring bills to have accurate descriptive titles.71 They
have enforced state constitutional debt ceilings 72 and borrowing
limitations. 3
62. Regarding the importance of separation of powers, see generally THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
63. Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1343 (Miss. 1983). ContraIn re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55,63-64 (R.I. 1999) (allowing legislators to hold posts in executive
branch agencies).
64. Legislative Research Conm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 923-24 (Ky. 1984).
65. Application of Nelson, 163 N.W.2d 533, 537 (S.D. 1968).
66. In re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176, 178-79 (R.I. 1990).
67. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984).
68. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederal
Separationof Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999) (collecting many of
these cases and analyzing different treatment of the nondelegation doctrine, an aspect of the
horizontal separation of powers, in state constitutional law).
69. Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847-48 (Neb. 1991).
70. Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1106 (Cal. 1999); Evans v.
Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1354-55 (Fla. 1984).
71. Borough of Mt. Joyv. Lancaster, E. & M. Turnpike Co., 38 A. 411 (Pa, 1897).
72. City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Civic Auditorium & Convention Ctr. Ass'n, Inc., 408 P.2d
818, 829-34 (Ariz. 1965); Boe v. Fos, 77 N.W.2d 1, 5-7 (S.D. 1956).
73. Schulz v. N.Y. State Executive, 699 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1998); State ex rel. Brown v.
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In the area of individual rights, state courts have issued many
rulings restraining state legislative and executive officials from
infringing liberties protected by state constitutions.7 ' Such rulings,
far too numerous to mention with any specificity, include decisions
protecting free speech, equal protection, and privacy, among many
others."5 In some areas without federal counterparts, such as the
right to an adequate education, state courts have in recent years
been extremely active in policing state constitutional requirements.76 According to one recent study, state courts today invalidate
77
more than twenty percent of the state laws they review.
In all these areas, then, state courts have periodically used
judicial power to protect liberty by restraining other branches of
government from taking actions forbidden to them by the state
constitutions-actions forbidden because they have been deemed to
pose actual or potential threats to the liberty of the state's citizenry.
III. STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM
The two different uses of state judicial power just described are
"internal"to the state in the sense that their exercise neither refers
to nor depends upon the activities or goals of any entity other than
the state itself. In exercising its power to shape the common law, for
example, a state court has no particular reason to consider the good
of the citizens of neighboring states or of Americans generally. So
long as it acts within any constraints imposed by national law, a
state court is free to adapt the state's common law so as to promote
the good of the people of the state, a good that need not be assessed
Beard, 358 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio 1976).
74. For data, see James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions:A

QuantitativeAppraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183 (2000).
75. Many examples are collected in WILLIAMS, supra note 55, especially chapters 3 and
4. Specific examples of some of the more significant cases include Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494 (Ala. 1975) (policing privacy); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)
(policing privacy and equal protection); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 667 N.E.2d 1270

(N.Y. 1991) (policing free speech).
76. See generally Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference
Masqueradingas Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State JudicialReview of
Education Finance, 60 U. PrIT. L. REV. 231 (1998) (reviewing state court activity in the

education rights context).
77. LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 1 (2002).
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in relation to the good of any other group.7" Similarly, when a state
court protects the liberty of the citizenry by enforcing the state
constitution against other branches of state government, it is free
to consider the liberty of the state's citizens independently of the
liberty enjoyed by citizens of other states. In the exercise of these
functions, state courts thus act as "agents of state power," exercising that power for the good of the state polity.
But organs of state government need not act exclusively in this
inward-regarding manner. Federalism requires that state power be
available for deployment outwardly, against threats to liberty
originating at the national level. This raises the question of whether
state courts have any role to play in the process of using state
power to resist national tyranny-whether, that is to say, they may
serve as what I refer to as "agents of federalism." This question, in
turn, raises two others. First, do state courts have the authority to
act as agents of federalism by using or attempting to use their
powers against the national government for the purpose of resisting
what they suppose to be abuses of national power? Second, if state
courts have any such authority, how specifically might it be
exercised? At this point, I wish to set aside temporarily the question
of whether state courts have such a role in fact, in order to focus on
the second, and in some ways more preliminary, question just
posed: if state courts did have such a role, how could they fulfill it?
Is it even possible for a state court to use its own powers to resist
national authority, and if so, by what means?

78. It might be argued that some of the pathbreaking commercial common law decisions
were motivated by, or at least responded to, an interest in improving the operation of the
national economy. See HoRwrrz, supra note 41, ch. 7. But this is not necessary in a common
law decision. It is also consistent with a judicial interest to improve the welfare of the people
of the state, who would be expected to benefit from improved economic activity. Indeed, it
seems likely that a state court would issue a commerce-facilitating common law ruling
precisely because benefits to the nationwide economy would be expected to accrue to the
state populace. One would certainly not expect a state court to care about facilitating some
kind of commerce nationwide from which the people of the state would not be expected to
benefit.
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A. JudicialTools of FederalismAgency
1. National Tools of JudicialFederalismAgency
If the federal structure contemplates a role for state courts as
agents of federalism, how might state courts perform that function
in practice? To see how state courts could serve as agents of
federalism, it is useful to begin by considering how national courts
do so.
Federalism is a two-way street, and courts of the United States
serve as agents of federalism when they use their powers to
restrain abuses of power by state governments. This is clearly one
of their most important functions.7 9 Yet federal courts perform
this function merely by enforcing the United States Constitution
according to its terms. That is because the Constitution by its
own terms restrains the ability of state governments to behave
tyrannically. The Constitution, for example, prohibits states from
creating aristocratic forms of government.'0 It prevents them from
abridging rights of free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom
of religion." It forbids them from violating principles of equal
protection or due process. 2 It restrains them from impairing the
obligations of contracts," or from impeding economically desirable
interstate commerce."" To invoke these limits, and thus to serve as
agents of federalism, federal courts need do nothing more than
enforce the Constitution as it is written. The national government's
role in enforcing the American system of federalism is inscribed
directly in the Constitution itself; it is woven deeply into the fabric

79. See Justice Holmes' oft-quoted comment, supra note 5.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
81. See id. amends. I, XIV; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947) (holding First
Amendment's religion clauses applicable against the states through incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(holding free speech and freedom of the press provisions of the First Amendment applicable
against the states through incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (defending incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
84. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).

20031

STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM

1749

of the document-in its text, structure, theoretical foundations, and
history.
This national role appears most obviously in the litany of textual
limitations on state power set forth in Article I, Section 10 and,
even more significantly, in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which places explicit, extremely broad, and judicially enforceable
limits on state power.8 5 Virtually the entire national Bill of Rights
is enforceable against the states under this provision.86 Federal
courts have also construed the Constitution to place implicit,
judicially enforceable, structural limitations on state power. For
example, the Supreme Court has on structural grounds invalidated state taxation of national banks 87 and state imposition of
term limits on members of Congress. 8 It has also held that the
Commerce Clause, by its own force, limits the authority of states to
regulate interstate commerce.89 These rulings rest on the belief that
the Constitution embodies and implements a theory of federalism
that authorizes federal courts to invalidate state actions which
threaten to disrupt the Constitution's careful, liberty-protective
balance between national and state power. Finally, the national
government's role in restraining state tyranny is also founded in a
historical understanding of the Reconstruction amendments, which
fundamentally altered the Constitution by adding explicitly to the
functions of the national government a significant role in protecting
American citizens from their own state governments.9"
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
86. See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.02 (1995)

(giving
87.
88.
89.

an overview of the incorporation doctrine).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (1 How.) 299 (1851).

90. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-

1877, at 582 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) (observing that
Reconstruction "marked a decisive retreat from the idea, born during the Civil War, of a

powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens"); id. at 24
(describing rise of national consciousness following the Emancipation Proclamation, which
"clothed national authority with an indisputably moral purpose"); see also JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLNANDTHE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 137-38 (1991) (The

identification of national military power with "Union and freedom.... helped change the
course of American constitutional development. Eleven of the first twelve amendments to the

Constitution limited the powers of the national government; six of the next seven
dramatically expanded those powers at the expense of states and individuals."); JACOBUS TEN
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2. State Tools of JudicialFederalismAgency
State courts obviously cannot serve as agents of federalism in the
same way as federal courts because they have no ability to control
the content of national law or to enforce it against national actors.
Assuming, then, that a state court does have authority to act as an
agent of federalism, how might it assert that authority? What tools,
in other words, might a state court employ to resist national power?
State courts, it must be conceded, possess far fewer resources to
deploy against national power than do the state executive and
legislative branches. State courts typically lack binding authority
over organs of the national government91 and are subject to direct
national judicial oversight on questions of national law.92 Furthermore, although state courts are typically more active and involved
in policy formation than federal courts, they still are relatively
passive institutions. Unlike the governor and state legislature,
state courts cannot simply voluntarily insert themselves into
pressing disputes, but must ordinarily wait for problems to come to
them before acting. Nevertheless, state courts do have one fairly
powerful tool at their disposal: their control over state law, and,
more particularly, over the state constitutions.
In a recent article, I explain how state courts can resist and
counteract liberty-invasive abuses of national judicial power by
giving a more generous construction to individual rights found in
the state constitution than national courts give to similar provisions
appearing in the Constitution.9" Here, I want to focus on a different
BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT chs. 4, 11 (1951)
(making similar arguments about the Fourteenth Amendment's elevation of national power
at the expense of the states and conceiving of it as a basis for continuing military protection
of the rights of ex-slaves against the states).
91. The United States cannot be sued in any court unless it waives its sovereign
immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). Even when the United
States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit, it has by statute retained the authority to
remove to federal court cases filed against it in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2000). State
courts also typically lack the authority to issue orders to national officials. Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (1 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (1 How.) 506 (1858); M'Clung v.
Silliman, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 598, 604-05 (1821).
92. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
93. Gardner, supranote 9.
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method by which the state constitution can be .deployed to resist
national power. This method derives its force from the fact that the
state constitution is the legal document that ultimately grants,
allocates, and structures any powers possessed by state officials in
other branches of state government. To put this proposition in its
bluntest form, state courts may participate in state resistance to
national power by construing the state constitution in such a way
as to assure, insofar as possible, that the state legislative and
executive branches have powers adequate to resist abuses of
national authority.
Within the federal structure, most state acts of resistance to
national tyranny will be undertaken by the state executive or
legislative branches.9 ' To resist national authority with the greatest
possible effectiveness, governors and state legislatures require
ample powers. What powers these branches possess is a question
determined solely by reference to the state constitution, the final
meaning of which is settled by the state judiciary. Should state
power come into conflict with national power concerning controversial issues, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that legal challenges
will ensue, thereby offering state courts opportunities to construe
the constitutional authority of coordinate branches of state government engaged in the dispute. In these circumstances, state courts
may well play an important role in state-national disputes by being
forced to decide whether the state constitution authorizes other
state actors to carry out effective forms of resistance to national
power.
For example, the degree of centralized state control over federal
grant funds has long been a contentious flash point in intergovernmental relations. Congress presently supplies approximately thirty
percent of all state revenue.95 In exercising this responsibility,
Congress often has been interested in distributing federal funds
in whatever way is best calculated to achieve as directly and
efficiently as possible the programmatic goals for which the grant
money is intended.9' This approach has often led Congress to
94. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
95. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 462 (2002).

96. This interest has consistently manifested itself in a congressional preference for
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provide grant money directly to state executive agencies. s7 State
legislatures, on the other hand, have sometimes viewed such
targeted grants as undermining state legislative control over the
ways in which state executive agencies raise and spend funds to

achieve programmatic goals. 98 Indeed, Congress has occasionally
viewed state legislatures, with some justification, as interlopers
bent on undermining congressionally imposed spending conditions
so as to divert state funds to unauthorized uses.9 9 To avoid this,
Congress has sometimes acted in a way that looks very much as
though it is attempting to peel off state executive agencies from
state legislative oversight so as to accomplish purposes dictated by
Congress rather than by state governmental processes. 100 State
legislatures, for their part, tend to see this practice as an intrusive
abuse of the national spending power.' 0
Congress, of course, has a great deal of freedom to specify the
conditions under which federal grant money may be spent,'0 2 and
federal conditions and oversight of state expenditures made under federal programs, and in
a concomitant congressional reluctance to simplify the associated administrative burdens
through use of block grant programs. See, e.g., TIMOTHYCONLAN, FROMNEWFEDERALISMTO
DEvOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVEYEARS OFINTERGOVERNMENTALREFORM 40-43,55-58,157 (1998).
97. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissectingthe State: The Use of FederalLaw to Free State and
Local Officialsfrom State Legislatures'Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201, 1260 (1999) ("Federal
statutes typically bestow federal grants on state executive agencies or governors .... "). For
example, the Women, Infants and Children Program (WIC) provides grants directly to the
state health department. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(b)(13), (c)(1) (2000). For an overview of federal
grant programs bypassing the state legislature as of 1980, see COMPTROLLERGEN., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. 660-81-3, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
SYSTEM SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PERMIT GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY STATE LEGISLATURES 1119 (1980) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO recommended increasing state legislative
involvement. Id. at 54-55. Congress seems to have followed this recommendation.
98. The federalism implications of this practice are helpfully discussed in Hills, supra
note 97.
99. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism:Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831
(1998) (describing long-standing presupposition in American constitutional law that "state
governments are unfit to implement federal law because state officials are devious,
demagogic, untrustworthy, parochial, and inherently rebellious and, therefore, ought to be
excluded entirely from implementing federal policy").
100. See Hills, supra note 97, at 1216-17.
101. One way legislatures responded was by increasing their involvement in oversight of
federal grants despite significant federal discouragement. See GAO REPORT, supra note 97,
at 38-43.
102. The main restriction is that Congress may not provide incentives so strong as to
amount to coercion. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). Coercion, however, has
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may specify that grants be made directly to specific state agencies.0 3 It does not follow, however, that state executive agencies
have the authority to spend money that they receive from sources
other than the state legislature. Many state constitutions, like the
United States Constitution, contain provisions requiring that
expended funds be appropriated specifically by the legislature. 0 ' In
reliance on such provisions, state legislatures have from time to
time enacted laws requiring that federal grant funds be paid into
the state's general treasury for subsequent reappropriation by the
legislature and prohibiting state executive agencies from spending
federal grant funds that have not been legislatively appropriated.0 5
On several occasions state courts have been called upon to
adjudicate the constitutionality of these restrictions on the spending
of unappropriated funds. Some state courts have construed the
state constitutional requirement of appropriation narrowly, holding
that it applies only to spending out of state general treasury
revenue, a description that does not apply to federal grant money.'0 6
Other state courts, however, have taken a different view. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, has held that the state
constitution limits the spending authority of state executive
agencies to the spending of funds that have been appropriated by
the state legislature,'0 7 and it has accordingly upheld legislative
never been found in practice. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th
Cir. 2000) ("The Court has never employed the [coercion] theory to invalidate a funding
condition.").
103. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1,469 U.S. 256,260 (1985)

(holding that the terms of such a grant may, under certain circumstances, preempt
inconsistent state law).
104. ComparePA. CONST. art. III, § 24 ("No money shall be paid out of the treasury, except
on appropriations made by law ...."), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law ....").
105. See GAO REPORT, supra note 97, at 27-30.

106. See Navajo Tribe v. Ariz. Dep't of Admin., 528 P.2d 623, 625 (Ariz. 1974); McManus
v. Love, 499 P.2d 609, 610-11 (Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d 433, 436

(Mass. 1978) (advisory opinion); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 986 (N.M.
1974); In re Dep't ofTransp., 646 P.2d 605,607 (Okla. 1982); see also Colo. General Assembly
v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156, 1173-74 (Col. 1987) (holding that the legislative appropriation

requirement applies only to those portions of federal block grants that Congress has allowed
state legislatures to control).
107. Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595, 605 (Pa. 1978); accord Anderson v. Regan, 425 N.E.2d
792, 798 (N.Y. 1981); see also Opinion of the Justices, 381 A.2d 1204, 1209 (N.H. 1978)
(holding the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act did not preempt state
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restrictions on agency spending of unappropriated federal grants. 108
In so doing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has delivered to the
state legislature a significant constitutional tool for defending its
control over state executive spending from erosion worked by
congressional grant-making strategies.
Even when these kinds of state constitutional issues do not arise
in the course of an active, ongoing dispute with the national
government, constitutional rulings by state courts concerning the
scope of state executive and legislative authority can have obvious
ramifications for the ability of those branches successfully to oppose
abuses of national authority in subsequent clashes. For example,
to resist national tyranny successfully, a state legislature may
find itself called upon to do two things: enact some kind of
legislation and appropriate money to fund its implementation.
The legislature's ability to do both obviously can be affected by the
construction given by state courts to the relevant state constitutional provisions.
Consider, for example, the California Constitution's urgency
legislation clause. Article IV, Section 8 of the California Constitution prevents most laws enacted by the legislature from taking
effect sooner than ninety days after enactment.' 0 9 This provision,
however, has an exception for what it terms "urgency statutes,"
which it defines as laws "necessary for immediate preservation of
the public peace, health, or safety."" 0 Such laws may take effect
immediately."' It is clear that this exception for urgent legislation
is intended to give the state legislature sufficient flexibility to deal
legislative authority to require the governor to designate a particular state agency as the
agency authorized to receive federal categorical grants under the Act).
108. It is not clear that this holding survives the Supreme Court's ruling in Lawrence
County v.Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 260 (1985).
109. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c)(1), (c)(2). In practice, the delay is likely to be considerably
longer than ninety days: Section 8(c)(1) sets the effective date of most legislation as "January
I next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute." Id. art. IV, §
8(c)(1). Given that the legislature is constitutionally required to adjourn by November 30 of
each even-numbered year, and its successor to convene on the first Monday in December, id.
art. IV, § 3(a), the effect of section 8(c) will often be to push the effective date of the
legislation to the next legislative session, giving the successor legislature a window of
opportunity in which to repeal the law before it takes effect.
110. Id. art. IV, § 8(d).
111. Id. art. IV, § 8(c)(3).
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quickly and effectively with crises. Yet the degree to which the
exception will be available to the legislature turns to a great extent
on the construction given the clause by California courts. The
language of the exception limits its use to situations where there is
"necessity," dealing with "public peace," "health," or
an immediate
"safety."1 12 The meaning of these terms is hardly self-evident.
In practice, the California courts have given the language of the
clause a generous interpretation and have tended to defer almost
completely to the legislature's definition of "urgency" by giving laws
enacted under the urgency exception a strong presumption of
validity.'1 3 But nothing compelled the courts to take such a
deferential approach. The ninety-day waiting period for legislation
and the careful wording of the urgency exception presumably have
their roots in some popular distrust of the state legislature's
judgment concerning the effective date of legislation. 11 4 Such
considerations might just as easily lead a state court to construe
an urgency exception narrowly. A narrow construction might
thus serve the constitutional purpose of protecting the people of
California from the bad judgment of the state legislature, but only
at the price of inhibiting the legislature's ability to protect them
quickly and effectively from national tyranny (among other things)
through prompt exercises of state legislative power.
Much the same can be said about funding. The California
Constitution provides that total annual appropriations may not
exceed appropriations for the previous year, adjusted for inflation
and population growth."' Any excess revenues must be refunded to
taxpayers."' However, the constitution directs the legislature to
establish a "prudent state reserve fund in such amount as it shall
deem reasonable and necessary." 11 No California court has yet had
occasion to construe the meaning of the term "prudent reserve," but
112. Id. art. IV, § 8(d).

113. See, e.g., People ex rel. McCullough v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175, 221 (1865); People v.
Kinsey, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1621, 1629 (2d App. Div. 1995).
114. See Busch v. Turner, 161 P.2d 456, 460 (Cal. 1945) (concluding the purpose of the
ninety-day provision was to allow the people an opportunity to file a referendum petition to
express their opinion on a statute).
115. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 1.
116. Id. art. XIIIB, § 2(b).
117. Id. art. XIIIB, § 5.5.
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it seems clear that a restrictive definition of the term could impede
the ability of the state legislature to respond rapidly to abuses of
national authority which the legislature might wish to resist.
In these situations concerning legislation and funding authority,
state courts have an opportunity to influence the ability of other
branches of state government to resist tyrannical abuses of national power with the greatest possible speed and effectiveness.
Construing the relevant provisions of the state constitution with an
eye toward what I call the "federalism effects" of their rulings might
not lead state courts to different results-but, then again, it might.
Here, then, is the critical point: in the ways outlined above, state
constitutional interpretation itself can be a tool of resistance to
national power. It can be a vehicle by which state courts participate
in the project of deploying state power to check abuses of national
power, a project contemplated-indeed, demanded-by a properly
functioning system of federalism. Constitutional law is a means by
which official power is projected into the political world. As a result,
judicial shaping of constitutional doctrine is necessarily a means by
which state courts may influence the way that state power is
projected against the national government and, to a lesser extent,
the way in which exercises of national power are experienced by the
people of the state. As a tool of resistance, self-conscious judicial
shaping of state constitutional doctrine is neither as dramatic nor
as likely to be effective as the tools typically available to a state's
governor or legislature. That should hardly be surprising given the
comparative weakness of courts as institutions of governance.
Nevertheless, just because state courts are weaker than state
executives and legislatures does not mean that they are incapable
of playing any role at all in the enterprise of state resistance to
abuses of national power.
B. FederalismEffects as a Factorin State ConstitutionalAnalysis
If state courts possess these tools of federalism agency, how
would they deploy them in practice? This is not the place to
elaborate a full-blown theory of state constitutional interpretation
but, in brief, the process would involve nothing more radical or
complicated than having state courts add to the usual elements of
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constitutional analysis an additional factor that takes into account
the structural role that state power plays in maintaining liberty
within a national system of federalism. As previously noted, when
a state court acts solely as an agent of state power, it need
concern itself only with norms and decisions internal to the state
--established, that is to say, by the people of the state and by state
government actors working solely to achieve the good of the state's
populace. For example, when a state court interprets a provision of
the state constitution dealing with a home rule provision dividing
power between the state and local governments, or allocating
functions between the state legislative and executive branches, it
is dealing with provisions devoted primarily to restraining state
power as it is felt by the people of the state. Its decisions therefore
have relatively few ramifications for liberty outside the state's
borders. In these circumstances, the usual factors of constitutional
analysis-text, drafters' intentions, legislative history, structural
analysis, and so on-suffice to give meaning to the provision in
question. 118
However, because federalism gives states a role to play in
resisting encroachments on liberty by the national government,
state power will sometimes be exercised for the purpose of resisting
national tyranny. In those circumstances, it might be appropriate
to authorize state courts to consider, when construing the state
constitution, an additional factor in the analytical mix-namely, the
potential impact of its rulings on present abuses of national power
and on the ability of the state successfully to resist such abuses in
the future. A court authorized to approach state constitutional
interpretation in this way would thus be authorized to ask, and to
construe the state constitution in light of its answers to, the
following kinds of questions:
1. Has the national government abused its authority or acted
tyrannically in some way to which the outcome of this case is
relevant?
118. This is where the so-called "primacy" approach to state constitutional interpretation
may with greatest force claim to provide an accurate and relatively complete framework for
the interpretation of state constitutional provisions. For further discussion, see infra Part

vi.
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2. If so, is there any possibility that a ruling by this court might
act to thwart or in some way minimize the effects of this
abuse of national authority?
3. Might a ruling by this court affect in any way the authority
or ability of any other organ of state government to resist as
effectively as possible any present or future abuses of
national authority?
To answer these questions, a state court must look beyond the
state's boundaries. It must decide for itself whether the national
government has abused its authority, a process that not only
invites, but may well demand, examination and independent
evaluation of federal judicial rulings construing the United States
Constitution. A state court must recognize and evaluate the ways
in which its own rulings may affect the liberty not merely of the
citizens of its own state, but of Americans generally. And it must
examine the capabilities of other branches of state government with
an eye toward maintaining their efficacy as actors in a permanent,
nationwide struggle between state and national power. " 9 In short,
to permit state courts to become active agents of federalism is to
recognize that decisions interpreting the state constitution can have
ramifications outside the state-indeed, that the power to interpret
state constitutional provisions can itself serve as a weapon capable
of being enlisted in the service of resistance to national authority.
In the next Part, I address several potential objections to this
account of state judicial power. Before turning directly to those
objections, however, I want to say a few words about what this
approach to state constitutional interpretation does not entail.
First, just because a state court is capable of acting in this way does
not mean it possesses some kind of inherent authority to do so.
Granting courts the authority to act as agents of federalism entails
certain risks that a state polity might be unwilling to undertake.
Later in this Article, I discuss the question of whether, and in what
119. An analogous kind of "trans-constitutional" structural inference is often made in
national constitutional law where the power of the President to act efficaciously on the global
stage is in issue. In such cases, federal courts have often self-consciously construed the
Constitution for the purpose of enhancing executive efficacy in foreign policy. See, e.g.,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,688 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
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circumstances, state courts should be understood to possess such
authority. 2 ' This is ultimately a question that turns, I shall argue,
on the degree to which the people of a state trust their courts as
protectors of liberty. But the power to act as an agent of federalism
is one that must be granted affirmatively to a court just as it must
be granted affirmatively to any other branch of state government.
Second, when it acts as an agent of federalism, the authority of
a state court does not somehow become unlimited; it does not
acquire the power to "rewrite" the state constitution in its entirety
for the purpose of converting it into a more effective framework for
the resistance of national tyranny. State constitutions must serve
several functions at once,' 2' and authorizing resistance to the
national government is only one of them. Moreover, these functions
often conflict: the more power a state government possesses to
resist national tyranny, for example, the more it may be capable of
threatening the liberty of its own citizens. Ultimately, it is the
state's people who decide how to balance these competing considerations, 122 a decision that state courts are thus obliged to
respect whenever they engage in constitutional interpretation.
Finally and relatedly, judicial authorization to consider the
ultimate impact of the court's rulings on abuses of national power
does not imply authority to reduce the process of state constitutional interpretation to consideration of that single factor above,
or at the expense of, all other factors in constitutional analysis.
Text, framers' intentions, structural considerations, and other
routine elements of constitutional analysis do not somehow become
irrelevant just because a court is also authorized to consider the
federalism implications of its rulings. 21 On the contrary, the
federalism implications of the ruling must be folded into the
120. See infra Part V.
121. For example, it seems obvious that a state constitution must grant the state

government at least some significant authority sufficient to permit it to work directly for the
public good of its citizens, and that it should establish some limits on state power sufficient
to restrain, at least to some extent, the ability of state officials to use state power for
tyrannical ends.
122. See James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural
Constraints in PresidentialElections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 634-39, 652-54 (2001).
123. Cf PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1982)
(arguing that different approaches to and methods of constitutional interpretation typically

coexist as alternatives, to be deployed depending upon the circumstances).
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analysis and should affect the ultimate outcome no more than their
relative weight requires.
IV. STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST OBJECTIONS

At this point, it is appropriate to address a set of related
objections to the account of state judicial power I have just given. In
the system described above, state courts may be granted the
authority, in a set of narrow circumstances, to serve as agents of
federalism by self-consciously interpreting the state constitution to
achieve a particular result: helping the state resist abuses of
national power. This is an account of judicial power that runs
against the grain of the dominant contemporary understanding of
how courts ought to engage in constitutional adjudication, which I
shall call "strict constructionism." According to strict constructionism, the very idea of result-oriented judicial decision making,
even when consideration of the result and its consequences is only
one factor among many in the analysis, introduces into the
enterprise of state constitutional interpretation an element of
instrumentalism that is simply inconsistent with the appropriate
use of judicial authority.1 24
For strict constructionists, the job of a court always is to
faithfully interpret a constitution, and the practice of faithful
constitutional interpretation, on this view, generally excludes any
consideration of the consequences of an interpretation. 12 This is
124. In this sense, what I am calling strict constructionism does not align precisely with
the commonly recognized cleavage in constitutional jurisprudence dividing originalist and
nonoriginalist theories of interpretation (ortheir predecessors in terminology, interpretivism
and noninterpretivism). Even within a nonoriginalist methodology it is possible to take the
position that a result-oriented approach is improper on the ground that judicial authority to
consult more general conceptions of the good requires that such conceptions be consulted in
a noninstrumental way, or at least, if results may be considered in certain circumstances,
that their influence on outcomes is subject to significant constraints. For example, this is the
position of Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the best-known academic defender of nonoriginalist
methodology. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAWs EMPIRE 164-275 (1986). I do not intend to
suggest here, however, that result-oriented decision making of the kind I describe is
unconstrained-it is constrained significantly by the kinds of results state judges are
authorized to pursue.
125. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORI THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 262 (1990). Judge Bork argues:
The person who judges constitutional law by results reverses (the appropriate]
process. He asks what decision in each case is politically or morally attractive
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because the meaning of a constitutional provision is something
given to a court by the polity that made the document; 126 it is not
something to be determined by a court on the basis of its discretionary judgment about what the constitution ought to say to
achieve some normatively desirable result--even a result desired by
the constitution's drafters and ratifiers. 127 The constitution, in
other words, says what it says, not what a court thinks it should
say. x28 For a court to ignore this rule by choosing among potential
constitutional interpretations based even partly on their consequences is to engage in something forbidden: it is to amend, alter,
or update the constitution, actions that the people do not delegate
to courts but reserve for themselves.' 2 9 The reason for this rule
of constitutional interpretation, strict constructionists typically
contend, is that any other rule would be too dangerous: to allow
courts to alter the meaning of the constitution would give the
people's agents too much power, thereby putting popular sovereignty itself at risk. 3 °
to him, devises a rule that achieves that result, and then works backward. The
rule does not come out of, but is forced into, the Constitution.
Id.
126. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE 66(1986) [hereinafter BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES); BORK, supranote 125, at 16, 144;

Raoul Berger, OriginalistTheories of ConstitutionalInterpretation,73 CORNELLL. REV. 350,
350-51 (1988); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudenceof OriginalIntent, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POLY 6, 9 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 376 (1981) ("Our legal grundnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point
in time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all organs
of government until changed by amendment."); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-63 (1989); David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics:An
Explorationof Scalia'sFidelityto His ConstitutionalMethodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377,1382
(1999).
127. See ANTONIN SCALIA, AMATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
16-18, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the intent of the drafters does not take
precedence over what they actually wrote).
128. See id. at 39; Edwin Meese III, Address Before the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), reprinted in Construing the
Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 26 (1985). But see Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts
on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framersin ConstitutionalTheory, 63 B.U.
L. Rev. 811, 811-12 (1983).
129. See BORK, supranote 125, at 146, 174, 178; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral
Principles].
130. This view probably achieved its best known expression as the so-called "countermajoritarian difficulty." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
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Strict constructionism suggests at least two kinds of objections
to any practice that would put state courts in the position of acting
as self-conscious agents of federalism. First, such a practice would
be incoherent as an understanding of proper judicial authority.
Second, even if it is not, allowing such a practice would be a bad
idea because of the dangers involved.
One way to respond to these objections is to dispute strict
constructionism on its own merits. Strict constructionism, after all,
is a conception of constitutional interpretation that is far from
universally embraced,"'1 and in its more extreme forms it presents
3 2
some serious conceptual difficulties and internal contradictions. 1
It is, moreover, a tradition that might be said, even on its own
terms, to provide ample room for judicial consideration of the

consequences of constitutional rulings.'

I do not find it necessary,

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962); see also BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES,
supra note 126, at 66; RAOuLBERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 263-64 (1977); Raoul Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial
Review," 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 87, 87 (1981) (MA]ctivist judicial review is inconsistent with
democratic theory because it substitutes the policy choices of unelected, unaccountable
judges for those of the people's representatives."); Bork, NeutralPrinciples,supra note 129,
at 3, 6; William H. Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Living Constitution,54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 69596 (1976).
131. Justice William Brennan famously disparaged originalism as "arrogance cloaked as
humility." Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR
LAW & PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 11, 14 (1986). In practice, Justice William 0. Douglas utilized a distinctly
nonoriginalist methodology in numerous cases. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. ofElections,
383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) ("IT]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era.... [W]e have never been confined to historic notions of equality....
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) ( [S~pecific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance."). Contemporary academic critics oforiginalism are legion, to say nothing
of past movements such as Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies.
132. One ofthe best critiques of originalism's coherence as a methodology ofconstitutional
interpretation remains Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for OriginalUnderstanding,60
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). See also DWORKIN, supra note 124, at 318-20; JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6, 10, 16,
339-40 (1996); Brennan, supra note 131, at 11; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature,60 TEX.
L. REV. 373,377-96 (1982); Mark V. Tushnet, Followingthe Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784-85 (1983).
133. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, often relied on the adverse consequences
of proposed constitutional interpretations as a basis for rejecting them in favor of
interpretations that yielded more acceptable consequences. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
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however, to argue against strict constructionism on its merits. The

strict constructionist objections fail here for the more pedestrian
reason that strict constructionism simply does not speak directly to
the practice of state constitutional interpretation: it is an account
of judicial power that was developed to describe nationaljudicial
authority." 4 To attempt to apply it without modification to the
practice of state constitutional interpretation assumes the very
similarity between state and national constitutions that it is my
purpose to deny; it is to elevate the principles of strict construction
of the U.S. Constitution to the level of some incontestible "natural
law" of judicial power which, needless to say, does not exist.
A. The Objection from Incoherence
Strict constructionists might first object that the self-consciously
instrumental use of the power to interpret a constitution is by
definition an abuse of judicial power. For a court to engage in
result-oriented interpretation for the purpose of resisting national
power or for any other purpose, it might be said, is deliberately to
manipulate the document's meaning rather than to discern it, an
approach inconsistent with a proper understanding of judicial
power. Judicial power rightly understood, strict constructionists
might say, cannot be used instrumentally because it is not a tool
to be used self-consciously to achieve ends; rather, the judicial
role is merely to apply the law.135 A court that used its powers
instrumentally would be making law rather than applying it, yet
courts should never take it upon themselves to make law because
doing so usurps power allocated to other organs of government.136
This is a respectable and, in the United States, a venerated
conception of judicial power. Although this view presents wellU.S. (I Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (arguing against interpretation that would make the
Constitution "a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use");
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (arguing that interpretation of
the Constitution that would convert it into a "splendid bauble" should be rejected).
134. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 52 (noting that state courts are not bound by
Article III of the Constitution and often diverge from federal courts on certain issues, such
as justiciability).
135. See, e.g., BORK, supranote 125, at 4-5, 16, 143-53, 174, 178; SCALIA, supranote 127,
at 7, 38-39.
136. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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known difficulties at the margin in distinguishing improper judicial invention of law from proper judicial application of law, I", it is
fundamentally coherent and supported by a well-developed theory
of the allocation of governmental power. This theory, however, is
one that is derived from the structure of national power under
the national Constitution, a model that need not be followed, and
frequently is not followed, on the state level. It is, on the contrary,
merely one possible model of judicial power among many.13
Even in the Anglo-American tradition, judicial power has been
arranged in many different ways. Originally, the judicial function
was united with other governmental functions in the monarch,"3 9
and then in Parliament.14 South Carolina's first two constitutions,
written in 1776 and 1778, provided that the vice-president or
lieutenant governor in conjunction with a privy council "shall
exercise the powers of a court of chancery.""' Similarly, the
governor exercised ultimate judicial power in Connecticut until
1813 and in Rhode Island until 1842, when those states finally
replaced their royal charters."" Moreover, although American
national courts today generally adhere to the strict constructionist
model, they have not always understood it to create the sharp
distinction between lawmaking and interpretation that prevails
today. During the long reign of Swift v. Tyson,"4 the United States
Supreme Court freely invented federal common law, which it then
used to displace state common law." The Court eventually came to
see this process as inconsistent with a proper understanding of the
federal judicial power and repudiated it in Erie Railroad Co. v.
137. There is surely no better example of this problem than Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), in which the Justices could not agree whether the Florida Supreme Court was merely
interpreting Florida law or whether it was judicially amending it. On the Court's flirtations
with this issue, see Harold J.Krent, JudgingJudging:The ProblemofSecond-GuessingState
Judges'Interpretationof State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
138. See Hershkoff, supra note 52 (discussing divergence between state and federal courts
on justiciability doctrine).
139. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 58 (1999).
140. See H.G. HANBURY & D.C.M. YARDLEY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW 16 (5th ed. 1979).
141. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXIV.
142. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT of 1662; CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE

PLANTATIONS of 1663.

143. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
144. See Bradford R. Clark, Separationof Powers as a Safeguardof Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321, 1412 (2001).
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Tompkins,14 but the Court's repudiation was for itself and lower
federal courts, not for state courts. As I have repeatedly emphasized, state courts are situated very differently from federal
courts. They retain the common law functions that federal courts
renounced, as well as other quasi-lawmaking functions discussed
above."' It is always possible, of course, that state constitutions
have allocated state judicial power in exactly the same way that
national judicial power is allocated under the national Constitution, 147 but the numerous actual and potential differences
between state and national constitutions and between the nature
and functions of state and national power make that a conclusion
to be demonstrated rather than one to be assumed.
The proper question, then, is whether state constitutions in fact
authorize state courts to use their powers of constitutional interpretation instrumentally. That brings us to the next potential strict
constructionist objection: a state constitution could not coherently
authorize result-oriented judicial interpretation of the document
itself because such an exercise ofjudicial power is inconsistent with
basic constitutional conceptions of agency. Strict constructionism
rests on a positive theory of constitutional law.14 According to this
theory, constitutions are created by the people for certain purposes,
and in so doing the people create organs of government as agents to
do their bidding. The constitution thus comprises a set of instructions from principal to agent, 149 and, strict constructionists might
say, it is by definition inconsistent with the agency relationship
for an agent to alter the terms of its instructions or of instructions
issued to other agents.
There is, however, no necessary contradiction between agency
principles and the result-oriented shaping of constitutional doctrine
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
147. The more recent state constitutions have tended to borrow rather heavily from the
U.S. Constitution. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 46-47 (1998).
No state constitution, however, appears to adopt a model of judicial power as limited as that
set out in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See generally WILLIAMS, supranote 55, ch. 9
(comparing state constitutional provisions regarding judicial power with the strictly defined
role for the federal courts created by Article III of the Constitution).
148. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundationsof Originalism:An Account and
Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1991).

149. Id. at 9.
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for the simple reason that there is no reason why the state
constitution itself could not instruct state courts to use their powers
to achieve particular results. At the most general level, there is a
respectable argument to be made that an agent should always
treat any set of explicit instructions as provisional, and thus as
authorizing deviations, when compliance with the strict letter of the
instructions would thwart achievement of the principal's purpose
in ways unforeseen at the time the instructions were issued."o But
one need not go that far in this context because the possibility
cannot be ruled out that the people of an American state might in
fact affirmatively desire their courts to participate by any means
possible in state resistance to tyrannical abuses of national power.
It is certainly plausible-indeed, it is virtually certain-that the
people of a state would wish to have a state government that is
capable of fulfilling its role in the federal system as a potential
check on national tyranny; that is why the national polity, of which
each state polity is a part, adopted a constitutional system of
federalism. If the state polity further believes that the judicial
branch should stand alongside the executive and legislative branch
when resistance to national authority becomes necessary, it is by no
means inherently self-contradictory to ask whether the people
might directly charge state courts with the responsibility to do what
they can to make such resistance effective, including issuing
facilitative interpretations of the state constitution. In these
circumstances, state courts would not really be "using" the state
constitution instrumentally, but "interpreting" it according to
conventional understandings of positive constitutional law. Their
method of interpretation would, to be sure, include in the interpretational mix a factor that plays no role in the federal judicial
analysis, but state courts are not federal courts and their actions
cannot necessarily be judged by the same criteria.
As noted earlier, federal courts need not self-consciously "use"
national judicial power to restrain tyrannical uses of state authority
-even though they often do just that-because such a role is
inscribed explicitly into the United States Constitution. For federal
150. See WILLIAM N. ESKIaDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 52-55 (1994).
But see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 544 (1988) (finding formalism
desirable if the goal is to limit decisional opportunities of certain classes of decision makers).
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courts, judicial restraint of state tyranny and straightforward
application of national constitutional law are usually one and the
same. 151 State constitutions, on the other hand, do not explicitly
authorize any organ of state government to resist national power,
yet such resistance is nevertheless common enough. More
generally, the lack of express constitutional authority has rarely
been thought to be equivalent to a bar to the exercise of authority
even within the federal tradition, much less within the state
constitutional tradition, where constitutional grants of government
power generally have been understood to be plenary except to the
extent expressly denied.'5 2
The critical question, then, is not whether state courts can be
authorized, in appropriate circumstances, to treat the state constitution instrumentally as a tool of state resistance to abuses of
national power. State courts can be so authorized. The real question
is whether they have been so authorized. And the critical factor in
determining whether a state court has been authorized to serve as
a self-conscious agent of federalism, I shall argue, is trust: do the
people of a state trust their courts enough to allocate to them
the unique and potentially dangerous power of resisting national
authority through result-oriented construction of the state
constitution?
B. The Objection from Danger
Strict constructionism offers two possible objections to the
proposition that any state polity might actually authorize its courts
to engage in result-oriented interpretation of the state constitution.
Both objections are based on the belief that such a practice would
be so inherently dangerous to liberty that no rational state polity
would willingly assume the risks.
151. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119, 124-25 (1839) ("The constitution of the United
States is a grant of powers, where they did not before exist; the constitution of this state is
a limitation of powers already existing."). Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held:

(Tihe people, in framing the constitution, committed to the legislature the
whole law making power of the state, which they did not expressly or impliedly
withhold. Plenary power in the legislature for all purposes of civil government
is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception.
People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 534, 543 (1857).
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One possible objection to the idea of authorizing state courts to
interpret the state constitution instrumentally is that such an
arrangement inevitably delegates to courts the authority to rewrite
the state constitution. 153 This creates obvious dangers in that it
would deprive the people of control over the constitution, the
principal means by which they control their governmental agents.
Notwithstanding that the federalism effects of a judicial decision
would amount, at most, to only one factor among many that courts
would be authorized to consider, a result-oriented approach, strict
constructionists might argue, cannot be so confined. Once a court
is authorized to interpret the constitution instrumentally, it
possesses for all intents and purposes the power to interpret any
provision of the constitution however it pleases.
This kind of slippery slope argument, so often implicit in strict
constructionist critiques of federal judicial rulings, 15 is analytically
unsound. The power to shape judicially the meaning of a state
constitution is not a power capable of being granted solely in all-ornothing terms. Authorizing a result-oriented approach in one area
need not set a state polity on a slippery slope from popular
sovereignty to some kind ofjudicial enslavement. In this context, to
authorize state courts to act as agents of federalism would be to
authorize them to shape constitutional meaning only in a very
limited and well-circumscribed area, and then only when doing so
would serve the purpose of resisting abuses ofnational authority-a
function that federalism in any event charges state governments to
perform.
Strict constructionists like to divide constitutional adjudication
into two sharply distinct categories: faithful application of the law
and faithless invention of the law; judicial obedience to popular will
and judicial usurpation of the power to make fundamental law.'55
Yet even on its own terms, the strict constructionist model does
not neatly resolve the difference between judicial application of
the law and judicial invention of the law. On the contrary, strict
153. See BORK, supra note 125, at 262 (criticizing judges who rewrite the Constitution to
conform to their personal preferences).
154. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 127, at 47 (criticizing the concept of a "living
constitution" as creating "a 'morphing' document that means, from age to age, what it ought
to mean").

155. This argument comprises the essential burden of BORK, supra note 125.

20031

STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM

1769

constructionism's categories leave a distinct area of uncertainty
between the two, especially where the law is ambiguous. A state
constitutional instrumentalism responsive to federalism effects
of judicial rulings would do nothing more than shift the interpretational difficulties from one location to another. Instead of
trying to discern the line between permitted application of the law
and forbidden invention of the law, courts would have to discern the
line between permitted and forbidden judicial shaping of the state
constitution. The authority of state courts would extend only so far
as necessary to regulate state power properly, for the successful
resistance of national tyranny. State courts would not be authorized
to adjust state power more than necessary to achieve this purpose,
or for other purposes, or in other ways. There is no reason to
suppose that this line would be any more difficult to discern than
the line presently defended by strict constructionism. Indeed, such
a line might be easier to identify insofar as it lays explicitly on the
table a degree of self-conscious manipulation of the law that, many
would say, is always present in the adjudicatory process but which
the strict constructionist analysis obscures by denying."16
Even if the slippery slope argument is rejected, strict constructionists still might argue that any instrumental judicial
manipulation of constitutional meaning gives courts too much
power and is therefore too dangerous to permit. Every grant of
constitutional authority represents an allocation of authority
between the people and their government. In our Lockean ideology,
the people are understood to have an indefeasible right to govern
themselves directly in all matters. 5 ' They typically delegate much
of this authority, of course, but a popular decision to create a
government by constitutional means does not transfer in some
irrevocable, Hobbesian way the people's right to self-governance.' 5 8
156. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 124; Levinson, supra note 132; Tushnet, supranote
132.
157. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 4, 87, 89, 95-99, 243 (C.B.

Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). These ideas are clearly echoed in such canonical American
works as THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) and McCulloch v.

Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).
158. Cf THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN PART II 145 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1958)
(1651).
[Blecause the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make
sovereign by covenant only of one to another and not of him to any of them,
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Rather, the constitution merely embodies a popular judgment
concerning which functions will be performed by governmental
agents and which functions the people will continue to perform for
themselves. Direct popular action in a large republic is, of course,
difficult and cumbersome, but it can be, and frequently is, accomplished through constitutional amendment.
Consider the allocation of legislative authority. It is conceivable
that a polity could so strongly prefer to make all legislative
decisions itself, or could so fear allocating authority to a legislative
agent, that it reserves for itself all authority to make laws by
creating a direct democracy. Conversely, the decision to create a
legislature with unrestricted legislative power (as in the United
Kingdom) would allocate authority between polity and government
in a diametrically opposite way. By the same token, when the
people create a legislature but withdraw certain authority from it
through constitutional limitation, they allocate some law-making
power to the legislature and retain some for themselves: The
legislature exercises legislative authority in the areas permitted to
it, while the people exercise exclusive legislative authority in the
areas forbidden to the legislature. This popular retention of
legislative authority is undoubtedly cumbersome, because the
people can legislate only through constitutional amendment,159 but

there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and
consequently none of his subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed
from his subjection.

Id.
159. But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991) (arguing
that fundamental social understandings of a constitutional nature can be changed through
other processes of "higher lawmaking," including consistent expressions of popular political
support for particular positions). This idea is further elaborated in BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Occasionally, the people also retain direct lawmaking power through the referendum power. For example, the Colorado Constitution
states:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the general assembly
consisting of a senate and house of representatives, both to be elected by the
people, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls
independent of the general assembly and also reserve power at their own option
to approve or reject at the polls any act or item, section, or part of any act of the
general assembly.
COLO. CONST. art .V, § 1(1).
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the difficulty of exercising direct popular authority does not change
the nature of the underlying allocation.
Things stand no differently in principle regarding constitutional
grants of judicial power; all that differs is the type of authority
allocated through such grants. One authority typically granted to
160
courts in our system is the power to interpret constitutions.
The people could of course allocate this power to themselves-one
could perhaps envision some kind of mass, Athenian-style popular
convocation-but questions of constitutional meaning come up so
frequently, and popular decision making of this type would be so
cumbersome, that the power
to interpret the constitution is
61
inevitably granted to courts.
Nevertheless, strict constructionism holds that federal courts
must always confine themselves to interpreting the United States
Constitution, and must never alter even the tiniest part of it, for
any reason. This principle rests on the belief that the Constitution
embodies the people's decision to allocate to themselves rather
than to courts the power to alter the document's meaning.' 2 Any
other approach, they suggest, would create a situation dangerous
to popular sovereignty, in which unelected, unaccountable judicial
agents would be able to alter the people's constitutional instructions.'
Whatever the ultimate merits of this view, however, it is at most
a contingent, contextual judgment concerning the best allocation
of national judicial authority between the national polity and
a national court system. Although the reasoning underlying the
allocation of national judicial power is by no means irrelevant to an
160. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
161. In 1911, Progressive reformers developed a proposal for "recall ofjudicial decisions,"

a mechanism that would have allowed popular referenda on judicial rulings of constitutional
law. The idea was to allow popular "correction" of erroneous judicial constructions of the
Constitution. Unlike much of the Progressive agenda, such proposals were successfully
opposed by advocates of judicial independence. For an account, see WILLIAM G. ROss, A
MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 18901937, at 130-54 (1994); Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States
ProtectingState Judges from PopularDemocracy?, 75 TEX L. REV. 907, 935-37, 943 (1997).
162. As Justice Harlan once explained: "[Wihen, in the name of constitutional
interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded
from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending

process." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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analysis of how judicial power should be allocated on the state
level, it is hardly conclusive. In fact, when Americans subdivide
themselves into state polities, the problem of how government
power should be allocated between the people and their governmental agents looks quite different.
In the first place, the people of the states already have a set of
national agents charged with pursuing their collective good and
protecting their liberty, both from the national government and
from any state governmental agents they choose to create. The
people of every state thus engage the state constitutional decision
making process possessed of a nationally guaranteed minimal level
of liberty, as well as a powerful external agent, in the form of the
national government, charged directly with restraining any state
tyranny that might appear. In the second place, the instructions
issued constitutionally to the national government, because they
have been formulated through a nationwide process of compromise,
are beyond the ability of any single state polity to influence. By
contrast, each state polity has direct and exclusive control over
its own state constitution. This not only gives a state polity an
opportunity to improve upon the United States Constitution if it so
desires, but more importantly gives the state polity the ability to
change or correct any aspect of the state constitution whenever it
pleases. Consequently, a mistake in the constitutional allocation
of power is much easier to fix, as64the extensive record of state
constitutional amendment attests. 1

These differences in the context of state and national constitutional decision making have an important ramification: the
stakes for liberty are lower in the creation of a state constitution.
No matter how the state constitution is structured, and no matter
how state government actors behave under it, the national government is always available to enforce a floor of individual rights
that has been deemed acceptable to the national polity as a whole.
The national government is also available to use its powers of
persuasion, preemption, and conditional spending, among others,
164. As of 1996, the currentconstitutions of the various states had been amended nearly

6000 times. TARR, supra note 147, at 24. This figure does not even take into account the
frequency with which states discard and replace their constitutions, something a majority

of states have done at least three times and which some states have done as many as ten or
eleven times. Id. at 23.
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to prevent states from behaving tyrannically toward their own
citizens. Moreover, the direct control that the people of the state
exercise over their own constitution allows them with much greater
facility to control their state government by altering the constitutional allocation of powers. This enhances the ability of state
polities to tinker with different constitutional structures because
any poor decisions can be more readily corrected than at the
5
national level.16
In these circumstances, it is perfectly sensible to ask of any state
constitution the very question that strict constructionism assumes
away: how does it allocate the power to monitor and resist national
tyranny? Have the people retained all such power for themselves?
If so, then the people of each state will be responsible not only
for exercising careful vigilance over the actions of the national
government, but also for parceling out repeatedly, by constitutional
amendment, just so much power as the organs of state government require on any particular occasion to resist national abuses
effectively. This would of course be a cumbersome and probably not
very effective arrangement. Assuming, then, that the people of a
state have delegated at least some power to state government to
monitor and resist national tyranny, to which organs of state
government have they delegated it? Presumably, if the people
delegate any such power, they will delegate some of it to the state
executive and legislative branches, as these are the organs of state
government most capable of quickly and successfully resisting
national abuses. This leaves the question of whether the people of
a state might also wish to delegate to the judiciary some authority
to resist national power.
Of course the risks of such a delegation are obvious. If state
courts have the authority to reach result-oriented interpretations
of the state constitution, they may use this authority badly, making
poor decisions that the people of the state dislike. The state polity
might then have to chase after its courts, so to speak, regularly
amending the state constitution to undo or modify bad judicial
rulings. A particularly dangerous problem would arise if state
165. See Hershkoff, supra note 52, at 1888 ("Nor are state constitutional decisions 'fmal'
in the federal sense. Rather, the ease of state constitutional amendment through popular
mechanisms ... givels] state judicial decisionmaking a conditional quality that further
attenuates countermajoritarian concerns.") (footnotes omitted).
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courts, in an effort to give the other branches ample power to resist
national tyranny, interpreted the state constitution to give those
branches power of a kind or in an amount that enabled them to
threaten directly the liberties of the people of the state.
On the other hand, there are also risks involved in not granting
state courts the authority to stand with the governor and
legislature in resisting tyrannical national actions. If the state
constitution, strictly construed, bound the executive or legislature
so tightly that they were unable in a given set of circumstances to
resist national authority effectively, the people's only recourse
would be to amend the state constitution to grant the necessary
power. It is typically easier to amend a state constitution than the
United States Constitution, but that does not make it easy: even at
its simplest, it is a relatively slow and cumbersome process. In the
event of a crisis, it is by no means certain that a state constitution
could be amended in time to grant state actors the authority they
need to protect threatened liberties from invasion at the hands of
the national government.
V. TRUST AND DISTRUST OF STATE COURTS

To what extent, then, might state polities trust their courts to
engage actively in the process of protecting their liberties against
encroachments by the national government? Unlike strict constructionists, I do not believe it is possible to come to any universal
conclusions on this topic-far from it. Just as state polities differ in
the degree to which they trust other organs of state and local
government, so they inevitably will differ in the degree to which
they trust their courts. Indeed, a preliminary task a state court
faces when it interprets a state constitution is to determine the
degree to which its own state polity has manifested any actual
inclination to trust the state judiciary to serve as an agent of
federalism.
There are, generally speaking, two factors that might influence
the degree to which a state polity might be willing to trust its state
courts to act as agents of federalism: the extent to which institutional arrangements may be capable of producing ajudiciary that
will reliably and competently protect liberty against encroachments;
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and the actual historical record of state courts as protectors of
liberty.
A. Institutional Considerations
The trustworthiness of courts as guardians of liberty is usually
defended on one of two grounds. The first is that courts are
insulated from politics and basically unresponsive to popular
sentiment. The other is that they are not.
The first argument has been applied most frequently to federal
courts-though it is equally applicable to state courts that follow
the national model-and is based upon the institutional arrangement under which federal judges are appointed rather than
elected, and hold office for life.1 6 The belief that unelected,
politically unaccountable judges are the best guardians of liberty
goes back as far as the founding, if not all the way back to Plato's
Republic." 7 In a well-known essay, Alexander Hamilton argued
that only an independent judiciary could be counted on to dispense
justice, and that the necessary independence could be secured only
by lifetime appointment.' 8 "[Jiudges who hold their offices by a
temporary commission," Hamilton claimed, can hardly be counted
on for "inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution."6 9 On this view, the judiciary's lack of political
accountability enables it to resist majoritarian pressure,"0 the very
thing that makes it a reliable defender of liberty. Hamilton's

166. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
167. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (complaining of

the king that "[hie has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries"); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bks. II, III
(G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974) (describing the role and education of the Guardians, a class of
enlightened absolute rulers selected on the basis of ability and trained for leadership).

168. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
169. THEFEDERALiSTNO. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
170. Not everyone agrees with this position. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that the impact of Court
decisions is slight because the Court is ineffective at resisting or mobilizing public opinion
when that opinion is aligned against it, and that it is thus institutionally responsive to public
opinion); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker,6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing that the judicial appointments process and
disciplining methods applied by other institutional actors eventually keep the Court's
decisions in line with public opinion).
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position dominated American political thought for the republic's
first few decades: the first twenty-nine states admitted to the
Union
171
all created nonelective judiciaries on the national model.
Recent empirical studies provide some limited support for the
intuition that electorally unaccountable judges will be more willing
to defend liberty from popular passion than judges who must satisfy
the voters to gain or retain office. One comparative study, for
example, found that judges in nonelective state judicial systems are
significantly more likely than their elected counterparts not only to
hear challenges to controversial state laws but, when they hear
them, to invalidate the laws. 17 Another study found that elected
state judges are less likely to dissent in controversial cases when
their constituents agree ideologically with the outcome of the
73
case. 1

Since the Jacksonian era, however, a second and basically incompatible view ofjudicial trustworthiness has grown up along-side
the Hamiltonian position. According to this view, courts are suspect
precisely when their judges are electorally unaccountable to the
people through democratic processes. Jacksonians, suspicious of the
corruptibility of politicians and convinced of the innate virtue and
capacity for self-government of the ordinary citizen, rejected the
founding generation's republican elitism in favor of a democratic
egalitarianism characterized by strong popular control over
government. 17' In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to
establish a fully elective judiciary,' 75 and every state to join the
Union between 1846 and 1958 followed suit. 1 76 The ideological

preference for elective judiciaries was reinforced during the earlytwentieth century by the Progressive movement, which pushed with
171. Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716 (1995).

172. Paul Brace et al., JudicialChoice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions,Context,
and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1265 (1999).

173. Melinda Gann Hall, ElectoralPoliticsand Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POL. 427 (1992).
174. See generally MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF
(1957); 3 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
1833-1845 (1984); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-1848 (1959); HARRY
L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990).
175. MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, §§ 2, 5, 11, 16, 18, 23.

176. Croley, supra note 171, at 716-17.
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great success on the state level for democratizing reforms including
not only an electorally accountable judiciary but also the initiative,
referendum, recall and direct primary election.' Today, supreme
states must face voter approval at some
court judges in thirty-nine
178
point in their careers.
If independence and a lack of political accountability were
thought by the Founders to be necessary prerequisites for judicial
protection of liberty, proponents of democratic control over
judges have thought such independence to be a serious threat to liberty in that it frees judges to ignore popular sentiment, invalidate
popular laws, and obstruct democratically desired reforms. The
Progressives, in particular, believed that appointed judges tended
to be drawn from a small class of economic elites and that they
often used their powers ofjudicial review to protect the wealthy and
179
powerful from urgently needed political and economic reforms.
On this view, popular control over judges, far from putting them at
the mercy of illicit mob passions, subjects them to a form of
democratic discipline that maintains liberty by curbing their
arrogance. This view stands at the foundation of strict constructionist objections to judicial activism.
The available evidence suggests that electoral accountability
accomplishes its goal of keeping judicial decisions in line with
popular sentiment at least to some degree and in some circumstances. The main limitation on the effectiveness of popular
control is the public's apparently limited interest in monitoring
judicial performance. 80 On the other hand, in those elections where
public attention does focus on judicial performance, electoral
accountability clearly can affect judicial decision making. Exhibit
A for this point is the electoral defeat of three justices of the
California Supreme Court in a 1986 retention election. These
jurists, including Chief Justice Rose Bird, were turned out of office
largely as the result of a high-visibility, negative electoral campaign
177. See, e.g., BENJAMIN PARKE DEWITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 213-43 (1915).
178. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 33 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 137-39 (2000-2001).
179. See DEWITT, supra note 177, at 238 ("Most judges, before they are appointed or
elected to the bench, receive their training in the employ of corporations.... [This gives rise
to a] tendency to bias the minds of judges in favor of corporations and property interests as
against individuals and human interests...."); see also id. at 23, 158, 160, 239 (discussing
capture of the judiciary by special corporate interests).
180. Croley, supra note 171, at 730-31.

1778

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1725

charging them with being "soft on criminal matters, especially the
death penalty." 1 ' The ensuing replacement of the defeated judges
with appointments by a more conservative governor fundamentally altered the California Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence: the rate at which the court overturned death
sentences dropped dramatically after the change in personnel."8 2
Since then, judicial elections have attracted increasing public
attention, as well as vastly increased spending by special interest
groups dissatisfied with the decisional track record of individual
judges."8 3 In 2000, total fundraising by judicial candidates exceeded
$45 million, a sixty-one percent increase from 1998."84 There are,

moreover, indications that "judicial elections are more and more
often high-salience events that mobilize large portions of the
citizenry."" 5 Elected judges seem to be "targeted" more often by
political opponents, occasionally for single, unpopular decisions.
Following the controversial Florida recount in the 2000 presidential
election, for example, some groups that had supported George Bush
threatened political retribution against the members of the Florida
Supreme Court who had ruled in favor of Democratic candidate
Al
18 6
process.
recount
the
over
wrangling
Gore in procedural
In reviewing these opposing accounts of the conditions for
judicial trustworthiness, I do not mean to take, or even to suggest,
any particular position on the merits of the debate. Indeed, the
nature of the dispute reveals clearly that one's position on judicial
independence depends critically on fundamental and controversial
181. John T. Wold &John H. Culver, The Defeat ofthe CaliforniaJustices: The Campaign,
The Electorate,and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 350 (1987).
182. After Governor George Deukmejian, a Republican, replaced the three defeated
justices, who had been appointed by Democrat Jerry Brown, the California Supreme Court's
aflirmance rate in death penalty cases went from six to seventy-seven percent. HARRY P.
STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 50, 149-50 (1992).
183. For an account of business-oriented interests spending against judges who have
issued rulings favoring environmental concerns, see ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PROJECT,
CHANGING THE RULES BY CHANGING THE PLAYERS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE IN STATE
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2000).
184. DEBORAH GOLDBERT & CRAIG HOLMAN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
7 (2002).

185. Croley, supra note 171, at 734.
186. See Dexter Filkins, Republican Group Seeks to Unseat Three Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2000, at A31; Lucy Morgan, House Speaker Says [Florida]Supreme Court Needs
Overhaul, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at 4B.
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assumptions about the comparative political virtue and competence
of democratic citizens and public officials. Clearly, there is no
universal agreement on these principles at the state level. Today,
twenty-two states have chosen to elect judges of the highest court,
ten use appointment, and sixteen use a system of initial appointment followed by retention elections."8 7 In New Mexico judges are
initially appointed and then face subsequent partisan elections, and
in Virginia all judges are elected by the state legislature."' 8 The
methods of selection are even more diverse for lower court judges.'89
On the other hand, I do wish to suggest by this discussion that
there are possible grounds upon which a state polity could decide to
invest its trust in state courts as guardians of liberty; that these
grounds are potentially serious and substantial; and that they
cannot be dismissed out of hand as inadequate to support a rational
decision to charge state courts with significant responsibility for
protecting the state polity against abuses of power by the national
government.190
B. The Record of State Courts as Guardiansof Liberty
The institutional considerations discussed above operate mainly
at a theoretical level. It is thus worth looking beyond the structural
parameters to inquire whether the actual record of state courts in
the protection of individual liberty furnishes any additional reasons
to trust or distrust them.
Although generalizations in this area can be misleading, it seems
fair to say that courts today enjoy a relatively solid reputation in
American society as guardians of liberty.' 9 ' Certainly, it is not
187. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 33 THE BOOK OFTHE STATES 137-39 (2000-2001).
188. Id. at 138-39.
189. Id. at 137-39.
190. For recent, informative, and wide-ranging discussions of judicial selection and
independence, see Special Series, JudicialIndependence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791-1053
(2002); Symposium, Selection of State Judges, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 287 (2002).
191. To the extent that polling data can bear out this impression, it seems to do so. For
example, according to a poll taken in September 2002, sixty percent of Americans surveyed
approved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its job. The Gallup Poll, Sept. 5-8,
2002, availableat http://www.pollingreport.com/Court.htm (last visited Oct. 27,2002). Even
in December 2000, just after the Court issued its controversial ruling halting the Florida
recount in the 2000 presidential election, forty-six percent of respondents said they had "a
great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Supreme Court. An additional thirty-three
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venturing too much to say that independent judicial review under
and enforcement of a protective Bill of Rights is widely considered
to be one of the cornerstones of American liberty.'92 To be sure, this
view is not universally held. Critics on the right often complain that
courts usurp popular authority, whereas those on the left often
criticize courts for refusing to go far enough in the protection of
individual rights. 9 ' Even among the general public, perceptions of
the judiciary change with time. During the early-twentieth century,
the United States Supreme Court was sometimes seen as
obstructionist and tyrannical. 9 ' During the Warren era, the Court
gained a reputation as a vigorous protector of individual rights,
though in the South it acquired a reputation as insufficiently
observant of the liberty-protective properties of federalism.'9 5
Today, the federal judiciary is sometimes seen as inhospitable to
claims of individual right, or at least less hospitable than it was
during the Warren and Burger periods.'"
To the extent that courts enjoy a favorable reputation as
protectors of liberty, it must be acknowledged that such a
reputation is probably confined for the most part to federal courts
and derives principally from the record of rights protection compiled
by the United States Supreme Court during the 1960s and early
1970s.' 97 Indeed, the Warren Court gained its reputation as a
guardian of liberty largely at the expense of state courts, which it
percent had "some" confidence in the Court. CBS News Poll, Dec. 2000, available at
http'J/www.poUingreport.com/Court.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2002).
192. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1529, 1530-36 (2000).

193. This kind of criticism can be found even within the Supreme Court itself. Just last
Term, for example, Justice Scalia excoriated the Court's ruling in Atkins u. Virginia, 122
S.Ct. 2242 (2002), as resting'obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members,"
and revealing an 'arrogan[t] ... assumption of power" by the majority. Id. at 2259, 2265
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Popular dissatisfaction with the Court during this period is well recounted in
WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994).
195. On the general reputation ofthe Warren Court, see, for example, LUCASA. POWE,JR.,
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 238,255,284-85 (2000). For a vivid account of
Southern reaction against the Warren Court, see Ross, supra note 6.
196. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 57-59, 64
(1996).
197. See, e.g., JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS,
AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS ch. 7 (1998).
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repeatedly reversed in reaching many of its most significant
rights-protective rulings. In Mapp v. Ohio,' 98 for example, the
Court reversed a ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court allowing the
admission in a criminal case of evidence that had been seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.'9 9 In Gideon v. Wainwright,"°
the Court reversed a Florida Supreme Court decision holding
that the state owed no constitutional obligation to an indigent
criminal defendant to provide appointed counsel. 2 ' In Mirandav.
Arizona,"2 the Court reversed a ruling of the Arizona Supreme
Court upholding the interrogation of a criminal suspect without
first advising the suspect of his rights to remain silent and to be
represented by counsel.20 3 In New York Times v. Sullivan,' 4 the
Court reversed an Alabama ruling upholding a libel verdict against
civil rights protestors for criticizing a local police official.2 5
In Loving v. Virginia, 6 the Court reversed a Virginia Supreme
Court decision upholding a state statute criminalizing interracial
marriage.2 7 The list goes on and on. In all these cases, the protection of rights came not from state courts, but from federal courts
enforcing federal law. In the body of law generated by the Warren
Court, state courts all too often appear as insensitive rubber-stamps
of rights-invading state legislatures at best, and as outright
collaborators in state-level deprivations of liberty at worst.
Much of this has changed. In the last quarter century, state
courts have issued hundreds of decisions that not only protect
individual liberty, but do so to a degree that exceeds the levels of
protection mandated by United States Supreme Court rulings
construing the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 8
Many of the cases in which the Warren Court made its reputation
reversed extremely stingy rulings by southern state courts in civil
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 660.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 345.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 499.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 292.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
See Cauthen, supra note 74.
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rights cases.2" Yet today, state courts in the South may be as
likely as state courts elsewhere to issue rights-protective state
constitutional rulings. For example, in recent decisions, the Georgia
Supreme Court has barred the use of electrocution for capital
punishment on the ground that it is cruel within the meaning of the
state constitution,210 and has invalidated a state sodomy statute as
applied to consenting unmarried heterosexuals.211 The Texas
Supreme Court has expanded state constitutional protection for free
speech beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.2 12 Tennessee's highest court has
construed the state constitution to hold police to a more demanding
standard than does the United States Constitution for obtaining
a search warrant on the hearsay testimony of an anonymous
informant. 218 At the same time, at the national level, the United
States Supreme Court has decisively halted the expansion of federal
protection of individual rights,2 1 and in some areas has even
contracted the scope of protections that the Constitution had
previously been understood to provide.215 In this environment, state
209. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (invalidating conviction of civil rights
demonstrator for breach of the peace); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292 (reversing state libel
ruling against civil rights groups based on trivial errors in newspaper advertisements
protesting mistreatment); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (reversing state court
order requiring the NAACP to disclose membership lists).
210. Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (Ga. 2001).
211. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
212. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9-10 (Tex. 1992).
213. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 435-38 (Tenn. 1989).
214. Since the mid-1980s, the Court has recognized only one new due process right: the
right to be free from unwanted medical treatment. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990). At the same time, the Court has refused numerous explicit requests to
recognize additional due process rights. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) (refusing to recognize constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted suicide);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to recognize constitutionally protected
right to engage in consensual homosexual sex).
215. This process has probably been most notable in decisions concerning the Fourth
Amendment. For example, within the last twenty years the Court has excluded dog sniffs and
aerial surveillance from the constitutional definition of a search, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982), made it easier for police to obtain a warrant based on information provided by an
anonymous informant, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and it has extended the scope
of permissible searches incident to an automobile stop, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Additionally it has and made it easier for
police to search the effects of public school students, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985), and office employees, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).

2003]

STATE COURTS AS AGENTS OF FEDERALISM

1783

courts compare much more favorably to national courts than they
did forty years ago.
Nevertheless, these changes seem very far from having
penetrated public consciousness. If actual litigation decisions are
any guide, state courts today appear to be less trusted than federal
courts when it comes to the protection of individual rights.
Although evidence is difficult to come by, it appears that litigants,
given a choice between suing in state and federal court, prefer to
bring civil rights claims in a federal forum."' Even when they
proceed in a state court, litigants tend overwhelmingly to raise civil
rights claims under the United States Constitution rather than
under their state constitution,2 17 suggesting that they have more
faith in the body of constitutional law developed by federal courts
than in the similar body of law developed by state courts construing
state constitutions.
Interpreting the record of state courts is made even more difficult
by the apparently cyclical nature of rights-protectiveness on the
state and national benches. If state courts were less willing than
federal courts to stand up to state legislatures during the middleto late-twentieth century, they were far more active than federal
216. It seems reasonably clear that this is the case when the plaintiffpossesses a federally
protected right. That is to say, plaintiffs tend to prefer going to federal court to enforce
federal rights, a premise consistent with the rationale for both federal question jurisdiction
and removal. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationalesfor FederalQuestionJurisdiction:
An EmpiricalExaminationofStudent RightsLitigation, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1315 (finding that
plaintiffs hoping to obtain enforcement of federal rights prefer to go to federal court). When
this fact is added to the general perception of a lack of "parity*between the state and federal
benches-the belief, in other words, that state courts are not as hospitable to claims of
constitutional right or that state judges are not as competent to deal with such issues, see
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY
OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1999)-it seems likely that plaintiffs with potential claims under

both the state and federal constitutions would be more likely to proceed in federal court, even
if that meant forgoing the potential state constitutional claim. For a very quick and dirty
inquiry supporting this conclusion, see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 784 (1992). Indeed, it might be the case that any
civil plaintiff with a federal constitutional claim will also, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, possess a parallel state constitutional claim. Such a plaintiff, by proceeding in federal
court on a theory of federal question jurisdiction, might forgo the possibility of raising the
state constitutional claim entirely. It is possible for a federal court to hear a state
constitutional claim through its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, but federal courts are
not always eager to hear such claims. See Robert A. Schapiro, PolyphonicFederalism:State
Constitutionsin the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1418-24 (1999).
217. See TARR, supra note 147, at 166-68 (citing a number of very useful sources).
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courts in striking down state legislation on constitutional grounds
during the late-nineteenth century.2 18 According to one study, the
Virginia Supreme Court invalidated about one-third of all state
statutes it reviewed during this period.21 9 In what may be the only
comparative study of the protection of liberty by different organs of
state government, John Dinan found that, in general, state courts
have historically done no worse than state legislatures at protecting
liberty, and have often done a betterjob, particularly during periods
of political stress. 220 The United States Supreme Court, it might be
noted, has not always done its best work during such times, as the
Dred Scott v. Sanford22' and Korematsu v. United States222 rulings
attest.
To complicate the picture further, it is not entirely clear that the
record of state courts in standing up to other organs of state
government is particularly relevant for present purposes. Our
inquiry here focuses on whether state polities might have reasons
to trust state courts to stand up to the nationalgovernment, not the
state legislature or governor. On that score, state courts appear to
have achieved decidedly, though by no means uniformly, better
results.
Before 1850, state courts routinely asserted state judicial power
against the national government. It was widely assumed at the
time, for example, that state courts had the authority to issue writs
of mandamus and habeas corpus to federal officials, 2 3 a power
that state courts exercised with some frequency. For example, in
numerous cases state courts issued writs of habeas corpus to
national military officers ordering them to release from custody
minors who had illegally enlisted in the armed forces.22 4 In at least
218. Id. at 123-24.
219. Id.

at 124 (citing MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 362 (1977)).
220. DINAN, supranote 197, at 155, 166.

221. 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857).
222. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
223. See Richard S. Arnold, The Power ofState Courtsto EnjoinFederal Officers, 73 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1964); James L. Bishop, The JurisdictionofState and FederalCourtsover Federal
Officers, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1909); Michael Vitiello, The Power of State Legislatures to
Subpoena Federal Officials, 58 TUL. L. REV. 548 (1983).
224. See Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. 227 (1836); Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11
Mass. 67 (1814); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Mass. 63 (1814); In re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471
(N.Y. 1827); see also State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841) (denying writ of habeas corpus on
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one case, a state court ordered national military officials to release
from custody a soldier who, the court found, had been improperly
convicted of treason.22 In ordering the prisoner released from
national military custody, the state judge, Chancellor Kent of New
York, observed: "It is the indispensable duty of this court ... to act

as a faithful guardian of the personal liberty of the citizen, and to
give ready and effectual aid to the means provided by law for its
security."226 In all of these cases, federal officials produced the
prisoners upon state court order, and released them when
commanded to do so.
In 1821, complaining of "the growing pretensions of some of the
State Courts over the exercise of the powers of the general
government," the United States Supreme Court ruled in M'Clung
v. Silliman227 that state courts lacked the authority to issue writs
of mandamus to national officials or their agents. 228 Even so, state

courts continued for almost forty years to issue writs of habeas
corpus releasing prisoners from federal custody until the Court
ruled in 1858, in the case of Ableman v. Booth,229 that state courts
lacked the authority to issue such writs. 20 Ableman arose out of a
dispute under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in which Booth, a
Wisconsin abolitionist, had been convicted by a federal commissioner of abetting the escape of a fugitive slave. Booth, imprisoned
for the offense, applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the Wisconsin
courts, which ordered him discharged. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, observing pointedly that "no one will suppose that
a Government which has now lasted nearly seventy years ... could
have lasted a single year ... if offences against its laws could not

have been punished without the consent of the State in which the
culprit was found.""'

ground that the minor ratified his enlistment upon reaching majority); United States v.
Wyngall, 5 Hill 16 (N.Y. 1843) (concluding plaintiffs alienage does not void validity of
enlistment and denying writ of habeas corpus).
225. In re Samuel Stacy, Jr., 10 Johns. 327 (N.Y. 1813).
226. Id. at 333.
227. 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
228. Id. at 598.
229. 62 U.S. (1 How.) 506 (1858).
230. Id. at 515.
231. Id.
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Notwithstanding the ruling in Ableman, state courts continued
to issue writs of habeas corpus ordering the release of federal
prisoners for another decade. Apparently giving Ableman the
narrowest possible construction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
1870 thus affirmed the decision of a lower court issuing a writ of
habeas corpus to a federal military officer ordering the release from
military custody of an underage enlistee. In Tarble's Case,2. 2 the
U.S. Supreme Court delivered what was apparently the coup de
grace to this particular kind of flexing of state judicial muscle.
The struggle waged by state courts over their authority to issue
writs of mandamus and habeas corpus was itself the residue of a
much more general and at times bitter struggle state courts waged
earlier in the nineteenth century against the appellate authority of
the United States Supreme Court. In the best known dispute,
Virginia's highest court refused to acknowledge the authority of the
United States Supreme Court to overturn its decisions construing
federal law. In a case dealing with the effect of a post-Revolutionary
War United States treaty on the rights of a landowner, the Virginia
court held in favor of one party and the United States Supreme
Court reversed, remanding the case with instructions to the
Virginia appellate court to enterjudgment for the opposite party. 233
The Virginia court refused to do so, arguing that the Constitution
did not confer upon the United States Supreme Court the authority
to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts.23 ' On a
subsequent appeal, the United States Supreme Court was required
to issue an additional ruling affirming its authority to exercise such
jurisdiction and renewed its order to the Virginia courts to comply
with the appellate mandate,2"' which the state court reluctantly did.
If in the first half of the nineteenth century state judicial
resistance to national power was based primarily on principled
disagreement over the scope of national power, after 1850 such
resistance took on a decidedly different character. In that year,
Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act, 23 6 a law designed to

strengthen enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the U.S.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 397 (1871).
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 603, 627-28 (1813).
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 7-8 (1813).
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337-38, 362 (1816).
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
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Constitution237 by nationalizing it. A 1793 act of Congress had
given, or at least had been construed by state courts to give,
substantial independent responsibility to state judicial systems for
adjudicating issues arising in connection with the rendition of
escaped slaves.23 8 State courts outside the South, occasionally
unfriendly to the institution of slavery, had sometimes exercised
their independence in ways that impeded the efforts of slave owners
to recover escaped slaves.239 The Fugitive Slave Act was meant to
prevent state interference with the rendition of slaves by bypassing
state judicial systems entirely. The Act thus created a system of
federal commissioners to preside over the rendition process who
were authorized to adjudicate any necessary legal or factual issues.
With the appellate authority of the United States Supreme Court
well established, and Supreme Court rulings on the books substantially limiting the authority of state courts to interfere with the
exercise of national power, any state judicial resistance to the
Fugitive Slave Act partook more of the flavor of outright defiance
of national authority than of reasoned disagreement over first
principles of constitutional law. Unwilling to defy apparently lawful
national authority, a succession of "independent and high-minded
judges" sitting on state courts in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
New York and elsewhere upheld the constitutionality of the Act
against abolitionist attacks.24 Not all did so, however; some state
judges did engage in defiance of a national law that they believed
intolerably invaded liberty through its support for the institution of
slavery.
Particularly in Ohio and Wisconsin, the willingness of state
judges to defy national authority under the Fugitive Slave Act led
237. The Fugitive Slave Clause reads:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered upon Claim
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
238. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
239. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

ch. 10 (1975); Paul Finkelman, State ConstitutionalProtectionsofLiberty and the Antebellum
New Jersey Supreme Court: Chief Justice Hornblower and the Fugitive Slave Law, 23
RUTGERS L.J. 753 (1992).
240. COVER, supra note 239, at 178.
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to what soon became a well-choreographed routine. Abolitionists
in the state helped a fugitive slave escape to freedom. The owner
obtained a warrant for return of the slave from a federal commissioner.241 A federal marshal arrested the fugitive. Friends of the
escapee went to state court to obtain a writ of habeas corpus
ordering the fugitive released.2 42 The marshal refused to comply
with the state court order, and was arrested by a state law
enforcement official on charges of contempt of court. The marshal
then sought and obtained from the local federal court a writ of
habeas corpus ordering the state law enforcement official to release
him. 243 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ableman,
combined perhaps with the tactic's overall lack of ultimate success,
eventually put an end to this particular method of state judicial
resistance.
A century later, some state courts again evinced a willingness to
resist national power when, they believed, it was exercised in a
manner inconsistent with a proper understanding of the requirements of liberty. Although the partisans took different sides on the
merits of the issues in question, the nature of the resistance itself
was similar. During the 1950s and 1960s, state judicial resistance
to national authority often took the form of refusals to comply with,
or fully to enforce, rulings of the Warren Court concerning
desegregation and the protection of individual liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although most state courts seem to have
tried their best to comply with Supreme Court mandates, examples
of defiance, or at least evasion, are plentiful.244 In clearly meritorious litigation to force desegregation of the University of Florida
Law School, for instance, the Florida Supreme Court managed to
rule three times against the plaintiff, issuing two of its decisions
even after the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education.245 A few years later, the Florida Supreme
Court again defied the United States Supreme Court, necessitating
241. Id. at 183-84.
242. Id. at 184.
243. Id. at 183-87.
244. See generally Jerry K Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court
Mandates Duringthe Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REv. 260 (1972).
245. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), remandedto 83 So. 2d 20
(Fla. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 413 (1956), remanded to 93 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1957).
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multiple reversals, in litigation attempting to bar prayer in public
schools.2 46
In Williams v. Georgia,2 47 a capital murder case, a black defendant had been convicted by a jury from which blacks had been
excluded, the unconstitutionality of which the Georgia Attorney
General conceded at oral argument before the United States
Supreme Court.24 For procedural reasons, and as a matter of
comity, the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of
the state's concession, observing that it felt compelled to "reject the
assumption that the courts of Georgia would allow this man to go
to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which
the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled."2 49 On remand,
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence,
stating defiantly that "we will not supinely surrender sovereign
powers of this State."2 5
In other litigation over individual rights during the 1960s, the
United States Supreme Court needed two successive reversals to
gain compliance from the supreme courts of Virginia, Alabama,
Arizona, California, Ohio, and Georgia.25 ' A study of the impact of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence found fifteen
instances of state court evasion or noncompliance between 1950 and
1972.252 This kind of resistance was unsuccessful in the long run,
but it does demonstrate a willingness among state courts to assert
themselves against national power, at least in ways falling short of
complete and permanent disobedience.
By the mid-1970s, state courts began to develop a different
method for defying national judicial authority that was far more
effective than its predecessors because it could not be thwarted by
persistent United States Supreme Court oversight. Once again,
the state and national roles had reversed on the merits: this time,
state courts were the ones giving expansive interpretations to the
246. See Chamberlin v. Bd.of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962), vacated mem.,
374 U.S. 487 (1963), remanded to 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964), rev'd per curiam, 377 U.S. 402
(1964).
247. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
248. Id. at 377-78, 381-82.
249. Id. at 391.
250. Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955).
251. These cases are described in Beatty, supra note 244.
252. G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS 54-55 (1977).
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individual rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, and the United
States Supreme Court was reversing those state rulings in favor of
a less generous view of the scope of federally protected rights. State
judicial defiance now took the form of transplanting to the state
constitution, and thereby placing beyond federal appellate review,
the very rights-protective rulings that the United States Supreme
Court was rejecting as readings of the U.S. Constitution.
An early example of this approach appears in successive rulings
by the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Opperman.253
Initially, the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed Opperman's
conviction on the ground that his trial had been tainted by the
admission of evidence discovered through an "inventory search"
conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.2"' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the search was not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment,255 and remanded the case. On remand, the
South Dakota Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial ruling, but this
time under the state constitution. 25 The court reached this result
even though the defendant had neither briefed nor argued the state
constitutional issue in the first proceeding. This approach, of
course, insulated the decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court
from further appellate review by the United States Supreme
Court.

25 7

The California Supreme Court employed much the same strategy
in People v.Ramos,2' a capital murder case. In its initial ruling,
the California Supreme Court invalidated the defendant's death
sentence on the ground that one ofthe jury instructions violated the
2 59
defendant's due process rights under the national Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court reversed.2 0 On remand, the
California Supreme Court held that the same instruction violated
253. 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975).
254. Id. at 36-37.
255. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384 (1976).
256. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (S.D. 1976).
257. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("If a state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course will not undertake to review the decision.").
258. 639 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1982).
259. Id. at 936.
260. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983).
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the due process clause of the California Constitution and
so re261
sentence.
death
the
vacating
ruling
original
affirmed its
State supreme courts have also pursued the same strategy in civil
cases raising constitutional issues. For example, in a New York
case, a biomedical research company filed a libel suit against a
scientific journal that published a letter to the editor criticizing
its animal research policies. The journal defended on the ground
that the letter stated an opinion, not fact, and thus could not
constitutionally be the subject of a libel suit under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The New York Court of
Appeals ruled for the defendant and dismissed the case.262 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but
during the pendency of the appeal decided Milkovich v. Lorain
JournalCo., 263 in which the Court held that expressions of opinion
enjoy no automatic immunity from libel suits under the First
Amendment. 24 The Supreme Court accordingly vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals for
reconsideration in light of Milkovich.265
On remand, the court of appeals once again ruled for the
defendant, and on precisely the same ground.2 6 In its opinion, the
court of appeals not only distinguished Milkovich from the facts
of the case before it, but went on, apparently gratuitously, to
adjudicate the case under the free speech provision of the New York
Constitution.267 It interpreted this provision to create a state constitutional privilege for expressions of opinion-the very doctrine the
court had held initially, and erroneously as it turned out, existed
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Of course,
this move prevented a subsequent appeal to the United States
Supreme Court on the question of whether Milkovich actually
controlled.
I raise these instances of state judicial resistance to national
authority not to demonstrate any patterns of judicial behavior, or
261. Ramos, 689 P.2d at 44344.
262. Immuno-AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1989).

263. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
264. Id. at 22-23.
265. 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
266. Immuno-AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).

267. Id. at 1279-80, 1282-83.
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to suggest that state courts can or cannot be trusted to stand up to
national authority in any particular way, or at any particular time,
or in any particular set of circumstances. 2" Rather, I hope to have
demonstrated something more modest: that there is sufficient
evidence on the question so that reasonable minds might differ as
to whether or to what degree a state polity ought to repose its trust
in the state judiciary to protect its liberty from invasions by the
national government. In fact, the record of state courts, considered
in light of the available institutional arrangements, supports a
broad range of possible choices about judicial power. Certainly, it is
impossible to conclude a priori that a polity's choice to trust its
courts would be either irrational or imprudent. Thus, the only
question is: what has any given state polity in fact chosen to do?
VI. INTERPRETATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERALISM

AGENCY

A. A BriefIntroductionto State ConstitutionalInterpretation
Undoubtedly the greatest jurisprudential puzzle in state
constitutional law concerns how state constitutions ought to be
interpreted. For much of American history, even to have framed
such a question would have seemed odd, for it was widely believed
that the state and national constitutions were nothing more than
separate instantiations of essentially universal constitutional
principles requiring, as a matter of course, similar methods of
interpretation. 269 The possibility of a distinct jurisprudence of state
268. Sometimes things can work the other way, with state courts narrowing state
constitutional rights by following federal rulings that narrowly construe the scope of
nationally guaranteed rights. A recent example is Edelstein v. City and County of San
Francisco,56 P.3d 1029 (Cal. 2002), in which the California Supreme Court overruled a prior
case which had taken a more expansive view of the free speech implications of write-in voting
than the United States Supreme Court took when it subsequently addressed the matter.
Compare Canaan v. Abdelnour, 710 P.2d 268 (Cal. 1985) (invalidating a ban on write-in
voting as violating the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions), with
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (finding no violation of the First Amendment in a
state law banning write-in voting). InEdelstein,the California State Court thus pruned back
its free speech jurisprudence to match a comparable pruning in federal First Amendment

jurisprudence.
269. James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn't: Constitutional
Universalism in the States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 117-28 (1998).
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constitutional law began to emerge with the United States Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins. ° In that
decision, the Court embraced a legal positivism that deemed all law,
including constitutional law, to be the positive command of a
particular sovereign. 2 71 Because states are distinct sovereigns, the
Erie analysis brought into view the previously obscured possibility
that state constitutions could differ meaningfully from the national
Constitution and from one another, even concerning issues that
were addressed by all American constitutions.
Questions concerning a distinctive state constitutional jurisprudence did not take on any particular urgency, however, until
1977, when Justice William Brennan wrote a now-famous article in
the Harvard Law Review urging state courts to step up the
protection of individual liberties under state constitutions. 72
Brennan criticized what he characterized as a retreat by the United
States Supreme Court from the protection of liberty under the
U.S. Constitution, and encouraged state courts to counteract this
movement by interpreting their state constitutions to provide
greater protection for individual rights than the Supreme Court
was then inclined to find under similar provisions of the national
Constitution.2 7 ' As state judges began to contemplate Brennan's
message and, in some cases, to respond to it with action, 27'
questions suddenly arose in a highly charged setting concerning
how state courts should interpret state constitutions and, more
specifically, in what circumstances it would be appropriate for them
to reach results under the state constitution different from results
reached by the United States Supreme Court under the United
States Constitution.
Much has since been written on this topic,

275

offering a wide

variety of different and often conflicting prescriptions for state
270. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
271. See id. at 78-80.
272. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the ProtectionofIndividual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
273. Id. at 490, 495-98.

274. Within a decade, state courts had decided more than four hundred cases construing
state constitutions to provide greater protection for individual rights than the United States
Constitution. See David Schuman, The Right to 'Equal Privilegesand Immunities":A State's
Version of"Equal Protection,"13 VT. L. REV. 221, 222 (1988).
275. For a good overview, see TARE, supra note 147, at ch. 6.
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constitutional adjudication. Some, for example, have argued that
state courts ought to utilize a "lockstep" approach to state
constitutional interpretation, in which the state constitution is
construed whenever possible to have the same meaning as the
United States Constitution. 276 Others have said that state

constitutional interpretation should proceed "interstitially," in a
two-step process that looks first to the United States Constitution
for guidance and then turns to the state constitution only when
the individual right in question is unprotected by the national
document.277 Many claim that state courts should utilize a
"primacy" approach to state constitutional interpretation in which
constitutional rulings by national and other state courts are
consulted solely for their persuasive value, and the real weight of
decision making is borne by the state constitutional text and
history, the intentions of the state constitution's framers, and the
values and character of the state polity. 278 Some go on to claim that

the primacy approach, properly conceived, requires state courts
to utilize primarily a textualist or originalist interpretational
methodology that emphasizes fidelity to the language of the
constitutional text and intentions of its drafters.279
The account of state judicial power I have given in this Article
has obvious ramifications for the interpretation of state consti276. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court deliberately followed a lockstep
approach until 1997. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1 (N.M. 1997). Proponents of this
approach generally see considerable value in uniformity between state and federal
constitutional law, particularly in the criminal area. 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 13-15 (3d ed.
2000); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 102-03 (2000). Lockstep remains the dominant
approach in most areas of state constitutional law. Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court
Monitoring ofState Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (2002).
277. Developments in the Law: The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights,95 HARV.
L. REV. 1324, 1330-31 (1982); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutionsas SeparateSources of
FundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707,718 (1983). This approach has been adopted
by courts in New Jersey and Washington, among others. See State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641
(N.J. 1983); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
278. The most influential proponent of this position has been former Oregon Supreme
Court Justice Hans Linde. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the
States'Billsof Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
279. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 147, at 194-99; Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional
Interpretation:The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431 (1987).
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tutions. At the very least, it leads directly to the seemingly
paradokical conclusion that each of the many conflicting prescriptions for state constitutional interpretation listed in the
preceding paragraph is simultaneously both drastically incomplete
and partially correct.
B. State ConstitutionalInterpretationand FederalismAgency
Let me briefly review my argument. I have claimed to this point
that state courts are capable of serving as agents of federalism.
Should they occupy such a role, state courts would stand alongside
the state executive and legislative branches when necessary by
deploying judicial power for the purpose of resisting national
tyranny. The principal tool that state courts possess to resist
national power is their superintendency of the state constitution
-that is, their power to interpret its provisions. State courts can
wield this power against the national government by interpreting
the state constitution both to assure vigorous, effective resistance
to national power by the state executive and legislative branches,
and to provide more protection for individual rights than does the
national Constitution. Thus, my account of state judicial power is
"functional 280 in that it conceives of state judicial power as serving
a distinct purpose in a complex federal system of overlapping
powers and responsibilities. I have defended this account of state
judicial power against strict constructionist theoretical objections,
and I have shown that the actual record of state courts in resisting
national power, supplemented by any of a range of reasonable
assumptions about institutional constraints on judicial power,
provides a sound basis for a state polity to invest its courts with a
degree of trust or distrust that might reasonably vary across a
broad range. This degree of trust or distrust in turn prompts a state
polity to charge its courts--or not to charge them, or to charge them
only to some limited degree, as the case may be-with serving as
agents of federalism.
A state polity's choice about whether and to what degree to
authorize its courts to serve as agents of federalism has important
consequences for the interpretation of state constitutions. The more
280. See Gardner, supra note 9 (laying out a "functional" theory of state constitutions).
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a polity trusts state courts faithfully to protect liberty by resisting
national tyranny, the more flexibility state courts are authorized to
bring to the process of construing the state constitution. Conversely,
the less a state polity trusts its courts to bring their independent
judgment to bear on questions of state power and resistance to
national authority, the more fastidiously state courts would be
required to discern and obey popular choices made in the state
constitution.
This relationship is easiest to see-or at least works out in the
way that is most familiar from the national setting-when state
polities distrust their courts. Here, managing constitutional change
is reserved strictly to the people through the amendment process.
State courts in these circumstances are forbidden to "update" the
state constitution, or even to press its boundaries in the interest of
adapting the document to meet present exigencies. All problems of
constitutional inadequacy are referred in the first instance to the
people for correction. Courts here are servants that operate under
very tight supervision, forbidden to use much in the way of
independent judgment to solve problems of state self-governance.
Courts operating under such a mandate would likely be confined
to the use of strictly originalist and intentionalist methods of
constitutional interpretation. Because such courts would be
required to act with the utmost restraint and deference to the
popular will as expressed in the state constitution, it would become
imperative for courts to discern the precise instructions of the
people. Interpretation in this mode thus would focus heavily on the
text of the state constitution and the intentions of its drafters and
ratifiers. Furthermore, the strictness of this kind ofjudicial agency
would tend to render irrelevant the actions of bodies outside the
state, including the national government. Because courts would
have little or no independent authority to resist abuses of national
power other than through strict compliance with specific
instructions contained in the state constitution, they would have no
need to keep apprised of the way in which national power were
being used or abused in any given circumstances. To the extent that
the people of a state intended to take advantage of the availability
of state power as a potential counterweight to national tyranny,
they would either grant the responsibility for using state power in
this way to the executive or legislative branches, if they trusted
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those branches more than they trusted their courts; or they would
retain this authority for themselves, instructing the various organs
of state government through constitutional amendment how
precisely to respond to incursions of liberty originating at the
national level. Should the state constitution provide an inadequate
framework for responding effectively to national tyranny on some
particular occasion, correction of the problem would have to await
popular action.
In contrast, courts that have been authorized to serve as strong
agents of federalism will have been given a special kind of
institutional responsibility to oversee the state constitution for the
purpose of assuring that it serves as an effective charter for the
deployment of state power to resist invasions of liberty by the
national government. Judges who possess this responsibility would
then have some degree of freedom to consult their own views about
how state power and effective state public policy can best be
structured and deployed to serve the protection of liberty. Courts
operating under such instructions would thus be authorized, in
appropriate circumstances, to engage in a comparatively open, freewheeling kind of constitutional interpretation 2a that might more
closely resemble the process of state common-law adjudication
than it would the strict originalism to which their distrusted
counterparts would be confined. 8 2 The state polity would still retain
ultimate responsibility for the content of the state constitution, but
281. See Helen Hershkoff, PositiveRights and State Constitutions:The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1163 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Interpretationand JudicialSelection: A View from The FederalistPapers,61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1669, 1669 (1988) ([J]udges subject to periodic election may be justified in using relatively
free wheeling methods of interpretation."). Hershkoff argues:

Because state constitutional amendments are relatively ordinary events in a
state's political life, state court judges can demonstrate a greater willingness
to experiment with legal norms, on the assumption that their judgments
comprise only the opening statement in a public dialogue with the other

branches of government and the people.
Hershkoff, supra, at 1163 (footnotes omitted).

282. Thus, Linde's argument that "constitutions are not common law" is wrong at least
some of the time, and possibly more often. Hans Linde, Are State Constitutions Common
Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215 (1992); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional

Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of
ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001); David A. Strauss, The Common
Law Genius of the Warren Court (U. Chi.,L. Sch. Public Law and Legal Theory Working

Paper No. 25, 2002), availableat http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
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this responsibility would in all likelihood be exercised infrequently,
and invoked for the most part to correct judicial interpretations of
the constitution that stray too far afield from the rough plan of
state self-governance contemplated by the state polity.
The responsibility to serve as an agent of federalism, moreover,
is not one that need be granted to courts in all-or-nothing terms.
A state polity might trust its courts to some extent, but not
completely, and might thus wish to grant them only limited discretion to serve as agents of federalism. This decision, too, would
have ramifications for the kind of interpretation the state courts
would bring to bear on the state constitution. Courts with some sort
of intermediate mandate would not be confined to the strictest
forms of interpretation. On the other hand, in utilizing more openended methods of interpretation that rely on their independent
judgment they would be required to exercise a degree of caution and
restraint commensurate with the limits of popular trust in their
ability to serve as reliable agents of resistance to national power.
The main point is that there is a direct relationship between
judicial function and the methods of constitutional interpretation
appropriate to the judicial role. State courts that are charged with
playing a strong role in the federal system by actively protecting
liberty against national tyranny will find it appropriate to take one
approach to interpreting the state constitution, an approach
stressing some degree of reliance on independent judicial judgment
and comparatively loose, nonoriginalist methods of interpretation.
Courts that are not charged with playing such a role will find
themselves constrained to take a different approach to constitutional interpretation, one employing stricter, more originalist
methods of interpretation. Other courts may find themselves
authorized to employ a mix of such interpretational techniques, or
to employ them in some circumstances and not others, or with
respect to certain provisions of the state constitution and not
8
others.2 3

Because the appropriate methodology of constitutional interpretation depends upon the nature of the judicial function, and
283. For an argument that appropriate methods of state constitutional interpretation can
vary from provision to provision, and a rudimentary typology, see James Gray Pope, An
Approach to State ConstitutionalInterpretation,24 RUTGERS L.J. 985 (1993).
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because the function of the state judiciary in a federal system is not
fixed but may be structured by the state polity in a great variety of
equally appropriate ways, those who would prescribe for all state
courts a single method of state constitutional interpretation are at
most half right. As indicated earlier, some have argued that state
constitutions are best approached using originalist or textualist
methods of interpretation. 28' This prescription is itself only a
particular instance of the widely made, broader claim that state
constitutions must always be interpreted independently of national
constitutional law.285 Others claim that national constitutional
rulings should ordinarily be taken as the starting point for state
constitutional interpretation.288 Yet any of these prescriptions may
be appropriate for particular state courts in particular circumstances, and none can presumptively be appropriate for all state
courts in all circumstances.
The primary determinant of interpretational methodology is the
function assigned by the state polity to its courts in a federal
system of divided and competing power. The nature of that decision
is dictated neither by theoretical necessities, nor by some distinctive
essence of local character or values, 28 ' but by entirely contingent
considerations of popular preference, local history, and local
experience. It follows that the search for a methodology of state
constitutional interpretation must begin with the following
question: What function have the people of the state in fact
assigned to their courts? Have they authorized state courts to act
as agents of federalism, and thus to employ looser, nonoriginalist
284. See TARR, supranote 147, at 194-99; Titone, supra note 279.
285. See the cited articles by Linde, supra note 278. For other endorsements of the

primacy approach, see for example, Ronald KL. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:
Some Random Thoughts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 7-9 (Bradley

D. McGraw ed., 1985); FRIESEN, supra note 276, at 17-21; Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Reincarnationof State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 962-63 (1982); Friedman, supra note 276;
Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE

DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997).
286. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
287. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretationof State Constitutions:A Case Study in ConstitutionalArgument, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1219 (1998) (arguing that purported differences in the character of southern state
populations either do not exist, or do not meaningfully influence the content or interpretation

of southern state constitutions).
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methods of interpretation when appropriate to resist abuses of
national authority? Have they denied courts this responsibility,
thereby directing them to hew closely to popular constitutional
decisions by using strict methods of interpretation? Or have they
taken some intermediate position, authorizing their courts to act
independently in certain limited circumstances, or with respect to
a limited number of issues? The initial task of any state court
contemplating its state constitution, then, is to tease from the
document answers to these preliminary questions about the judicial
function.28 8

288. How precisely courts should go about this will be the subject of a future work.

